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Vol. 61

DECEMBER 1962

No. 2

BETTS V. BRADY TWENTY YEARS LATER:
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND DUE PROCESS VALUES
Yale Kamisar*
"Only where the unfairness is of greater substance than that which incidentally and ordinarily results from the failure of a defendant to have legal advice
••• do we get to the inquiry of whether there has been a failure of due process."t

1. HEREIN OF THE ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO COUNSEL-

IF You CAN AFFORD IT
Q. I am quite distressed by talk that the landmark case of
Mapp v. 0 hio 1 "suggests by analogy" 2 that the Court may now
overrule Betts v. Brady. 3 For whether one talks about the fourth
or the sixth amendment, there is much to be said for Justice Harlan's dissenting views in Mapp. "[W]hatever configurations . . .
have been developed in the particularizing federal precedents"
should not be "deemed a part of 'ordered liberty,' and as such ...
enforceable against the States .... [W]e would not be true to the
Fourteenth Amendment were we merely to stretch the general
principle [of due process] . . . on a Procrustean bed of federal
precedents."¼
• Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I am indebted to my colleagues, Professors Jesse H. Choper, John J. Cound, and Terrance Sandalow, for their valuable
suggestions.
t United States ex rel. Farnsworth v. Murphy, 254 F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir.), vacated
per curiam, 358 U.S. 48 (1958).
1 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Mapp has
evoked a wealth of literature. See, e.g., Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment:
A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. CT. Rev. l; Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v.
Colorado, 41 NEB. L. Rev. 185 (1961); Morris, The End of an Experiment in Federalism
-A Note on Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WASH. L. Rev. 407 (1961); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at
Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319; Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practice, 34 ROCKY MT. L. Rev. 150 (1962).
2 Unpublished address by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, American Bar
Association Convention, Aug. 6, 1962, p. 5. For the view that the overruling of Wolf
is an a fortiori case for overruling Betts, see Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused, 30
U. Cm. L. Rev. 1 (1962).
s 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Except in capital cases, whether the failure to assign counsel
to an indigent defendant violates fourteenth amendment due process "is to be tested
by an appraisal of the totality of facts." Id. at 462.
¼ 367 U.S. at 678-79. Since the earlier Wolf case seemed to equate perfectly the
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A. Evidently a majority of the Court didn't think there was
enough to be said for Harlan's position.

Q. That may be, but it hardly follows that a majority will remain unpersuaded when Betts v. Brady is reconsidered this Term.5
For the views set forth in the Mapp dissent apply with even greater
force to the right to counsel problem. After all, the fourth amendment does speak of unreasonable searches and seizures, of warrants
issued upon probable cause. This is the very stuff fourteenth
amendment due process is made of. Within the broad confines
of the concepts laid down in the fourth amendment, common
sense may yet come to the fore, the needs and demands of the
public may yet play a decisive role. 6 Contrast this with the specificity of the right to counsel clause. Here we deal with a particular
command, not general principles.
A. I find the language and history of the sixth amendment
much less compelling and confining than you do. Evidently, I
am not alone. Why else is there controversy, even now, over when
the sixth amendment right to counsel "begins"?7 At arraignment
substantive protection against invasions of privacy afforded by the fourteenth amendment with that furnished by the fourth (although it declined to implement this right
by excluding evidence obtained in violation of it) [see Allen, The Wolf Case: Search
and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REv. I, 6-11 (1950); Kamisar,
Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts,
43 MINN. L REv. 1083, 1101-08 (1959)], Wolf itself is subject to similar criticism: "The
term 'unreasonable search and seizure' covers a multitude of sins. It runs the gamut
from relatively technical or trivial infractions to flagrant, deliberate and persistent
ones.... There is much to be said, therefore, for an approach which would only apply
the fourth amendment's protection . • • to the states in some situations and not in
others, one which would have caused the Court in Wolf to stop and ask: Is this the
kind of illegal search that our polity will not endure?" Kamisar, supra at 1105.
5 Last June, in granting a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida in
Gideon v. Cochran, the United States Supreme Court requested counsel "to discuss the
following in the briefs and oral argument: 'Should this Court's holding in Betts v.
Brady ..• be reconsidered?'" 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
6 See, e.g., Inbau, More About Public Safety v. Individual Liberties, 53 J. Crim.
L., C. &: P.S. 329, 330-31 (1962): "State law enforcement officers can live with the exclusionary rule [in search and seizure cases] a lot easier than they could with a McNabb·
Mallory rule • • . . By modernizing the laws of arrest and search and seizure, either
by legislative enactments or court decisions (as the California and Illinois courts have
done), there will be far fewer occasions for the police to violate the law as a matter of
practical necessity; and there will be less need for the courts to reject incriminating
evidence."
7 See generally Allison, He Needs a Lawyer Now, 42 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 113 (1958);
Beaney, Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REv. 771 (1961); Fellman,
The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB. L. REv. 559, 587-90
(1951); Rothblatt &: Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt
Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 24 (1960); Slovenko, Representation for Indigent
Defendants, 33 TuL. L. R.Ev. 363, 369-71 (1959); Note, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 573 (1962).
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time? Preliminary hearing? Immediately after arrest? Indictment?
Why else is there uncertainty, even now, about when the indigent
federal defendant's right to assigned counsel "ends"?8 Before preparation of a, petition for certiorari? Filing papers collaterally attacking a federal conviction?
Does the sixth amendment right to counsel "in all criminal
prosecutions" cover juvenile proceedings?9 Extend to "persons
charged with . . . picking flowers or disturbing stalactites in
national parks, or scrawling their names upon monuments in national cemeteries . . . or exceeding speed limits upon federal
roads"?10 Does the problem raised by the alleged right to a courtappointed psychiatrist, accountant or some other expert needed to
aid the defense become a simple one, permitting of but a single,
obvious solution, if the claim is bottomed on a denial of the "effective assistance of counsel" under the sixth amendment, rather
than on the "due process" or "equal protection" clauses?11
· Professor Herbert Wechsler observed in his recent Holmes
lecture:
"I know, of course, that it is common to distinguish, as
Judge Hand did, clauses like 'due process,' cast 'in such
sweeping terms that their history does not elucidate their
contents,' from other provisions of the Bill of Rights addressed to more specific problems. But the contrast, as it
seems to me, often implies an overstatement of the specificity or the immutability these other clauses really have-at
least when problems under them arise. . .. I argue that we
should prefer to see the other clauses of the Bill of Rights
B See generally Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN.
L. R.Ev. 78!1 (1961).
9 See generally McKesson, Right to Counsel in Juvenile Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv.
84!1 (1961); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. R.Ev. 547, 568-73
(1957).
10 Doub &: Kestenbaum, Federal Magistrates for the Trial of Petty Offenses: Need
and Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 443, 445 (1959).
11 See United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting),
vacated, !152 U.S. 565 (1957) ("It might, indeed, reasonably be argued that for the government to defray such [pre-trial investigation] expenses is essential to that assistance by counsel which the Sixth Amendment guarantees'); United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158,
164 (E.D. Wis. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 911 (1957) ("without the assistance of an accountant the defendant is denied effective
assistance of counsel .•.• The effective assistance right 'cannot be discharged as though
it were a mere procedural formality'"). See generally Cross, "The Assistance of Counsel for
His Defense": Is This Becoming a Meaningless Guarantee?, 38 A.B.A.J. 995 (1952); Frank,
Toda)"s Problems in the Administration of Criminal Justice, 15 F.R.D. 9!1, 100·01 (195!1);
Goldstein &: Fine, The Indigent Accused, the Psychiatrist and the Insanity Defense, IIO
U. PA. L. REv. 1061, 1086-90 (1962); Note, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 832, 837-38, 851-53 (1958).
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read as an affirmation of the special values they embody rather
than as statements of a finite rule of law, its limits fixed by the
consensus of a century long past, with problems very different from our own. To read them in the former way is to
leave room for adaptation and adjustment if and w'hen competing values, also having constitutional dimension, enter
on the scene."12
Indeed, Johnson v. Zerbst13 is ample proof that we have read
the sixth amendment "to leave room for adaptation and adjustment":
"The right to 'have the assistance of counsel' was considered,
I am sure, when the sixth amendment was proposed, a right
to defend by counsel if you have one, contrary to what was
then the English law. That does not seem to me sufficient to
avert extension of its meaning to imply a right to court-appointed counsel when the defendant is too poor to find such
aid." 14
Moreover, we can overrule Betts v. Brady, or at least greatly
modify it, without stretching the fourteenth amendment "on a
Procrustean bed of federal precedents." It is clear that even indigent federal defendants charged with misdemeanors (at least the
more serious ones) have an absolute right to assigned counsel; 15
it is equally clear that under the Betts rule only the indigent state
defendant charged with a capital crime enjoys such an absolute
right.16 There is a good deal of ground in between. We could, for
example, extend the fourteenth amendment right to all crimes
12 WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in PRINCIPLES, Pouncs
AND FUNDAMENTAL I.AW 24, 26-27 (1961).
13 304 U.S. 458 (1938). "The Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel." Id. at 463.
14 WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 25. See also FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: ITS BUSINESS, PURPOSES, AND PERFORMANCE 50-51 (1961): "One may
hope that a majority of the Court will tum to the view that the appointment of counsel
is as indispensable to the just and even-handed administration of the criminal law in the
state courts as in the federal courts. It would be helped to reach this conclusion by avowing frankly that the Sixth Amendment does not furnish the real reason for the requirement in the federal courts.••• If the right to have counsel appointed in the federal courts
is acknowledged to rest on a pervasive sense of justice, it should be extended to state
prosecutions as an element of due process of law." For a comprehensive historical consideration of the sixth amendment provision on counsel, see BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-36 (1955) (hereinafter cited as BEANEY).
lo See note 13 supra.
16 See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S.
437, 441 (1948); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 676 (1948).
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punishable by as much as five or three years imprisonment. 17 Or
all "major felonies." Or all felonies, period.

Q. Then you agree that today, no less than twenty years after
Betts was handed down, there is little to be said for "formulating
the guarantee [of counsel] into a set of hard and fast rules" without
regard to "qualifying factors"; 18 and much to be said for utilizing
instead "a concept less rigid and more fluid" than the sixth amendment.19
A. No, not any more. Not after the Court has spoken so eloquently about the absolute, unqualified right to counsel-if you
can afford it.
Q. You would still be grumbling if the Court had done otherwise.
A. Of course I would, but that's beside the point. I would still
be grumbling if the Court had not progressed beyond the commonlaw origins of the due process confession rule, which equated "involuntary" confessions with those "probably untrue"; 20 if, in order
to protect against-and to discourage resort to--forbidden interrogation practices, it had not excluded improperly obtained confessions, however corroborated, however "probably true." 21
17 Maryland Court Rules now require the appointment of counsel in all cases
punishable by five or more years imprisonment, Rule 719b; New Hampshire bas long
required the assignment of counsel to indigent defendants in all felony cases punishable by
three or more years in prison. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 604:2 (1955). As Professor Slovenko
has pointed out, supra note 7, at 366 n.18, "in France no accused can appear at a Court
of Assize, which has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by death or by imprisonment
exceeding five years, without the assistance of a defenseur."
18 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
10 Ibid.
20 Sec 3 W1cMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 822, 823 (3d ed. 1940).
21 See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959); Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949).
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the first fourteenth amendment confession
case, had been on the books but a short time when Professor Charles T. McCormick,
drawing on state as well as federal cases, asked: "Can we not best understand the entire
course of decisions in this field as an application to confessions both of a privilege against
evidence illegally obtained .•. and of an overlapping rule of incompetency which excludes
the confessions when untrustworthy?" McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. REv. 447, 457 (1938). The post-Brown development and application of these two standards are discussed in Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and
State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 213, 233-40 (1959); Kamisar, Illegal
Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a
Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78, 106-13; Meltzer, Involuntary
Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REv.
317 (1954); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv.
411 (1954).
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I regard the "official discipline" 22 or "police methods" 28 test for
admitting confessions a welcome addition to the "trustworthiness"
test, but this hardly detracts from the fact that the development
of this second constitutional standard left the Court without a
rational basis for permitting the use of "real" evidence seized in
violation of due process.24 So it is with the question at hand.
That I applaud the decisions of the Court delineating the absolute right to be heard through counsel when one can afford to
hire his own does not depreciate the significance this development
bodes for those who cannot afford to do so. As I view it, this
development does no less than remove any "basis in neutral principle"25 for qualifying the right to assigned counsel. After all,
when a defendant is unable to invoke the aid of counsel to present
his case or to attack the State's, whatever the reason (his own
poverty or the state's interference with efforts to secure legal services he can pay for), the integrity of the process of ascertaining
guilt is equally impaired. 26
Consider Chandler v. Fretag.21 There, the only reasons advanced for stamping the right of petitioner, "to be heard through
his own counsel," "unqualified" 28 were the stirring words of Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama:
"Even the intelligent and uneducated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law . . . . He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
127 (1959). See also id. at 109.
Paulsen, supra note 21, at 429.
24 The only basis found in the Wolf briefs for treating confessions obtained in
violation of due process differently from other evidence obtained in violation of due
process is the unreliability of the former. True, coerced confessions are generally the
product of more serious invasions of "privacy" or "dignity" than illegal searches or
seizures. This may be a good ground for regarding fourth amendment rights not
"basic to a free society," but hardly a good ground for withholding the remedy of
exclusion, once the conclusion is reached-as it was in Wolf-that they are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." See generally Kamisar, supra note 4, at 1096-1100,
22 MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT

23

1117-21.

25

See WECHSLER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 21-23, 27.
For an incisive discussion of this procedural due process value, see Kadish, Met11odology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE
L.J. 319, 346 (1957).
27 348 U.S. 3 (1954).
2s Id. at 9.
26
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conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. " 29
Why does "the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence" diminish one iota because the
defendant happens to be indigent? How does the need for a lawyer lessen one bit when the defendant cannot afford to hire his
own? What is there about the quality of indigency that endows
one so affiicted with the "skill and knowledge" to prepare a defense, qualities his more financially able brethren-even the "intelligent and educated" among them-lack?
The rule of Betts v. Brady becomes still less defensible when
you consider the recent case of Ferguson v. Georgia, 30 holding, in
effect, that a state may not deny a criminal defendant the right
to have his own counsel guide him on direct examination. 31 Why
not? Because "the tensions of a trial for an accused with life or
liberty at stake might alone render him utterly unfit to give his
explanation properly and completely." 32 Because otherwise defendant's right to tell his side of it becomes "a trap into which
29 287 U.S. 45, 69 (19!12), quoted with approval in Chandler, !148 U.S. at 9-10. (Emphasis added by Court in Chandler.)
so !165 U.S. 570 (1961).
31 Georgia is the only state-and apparently the only jurisdiction in the commonlaw world-to retain [by statute, GA. CoDE ANN. § !18-416 (1954)] the common-law rule
that a criminal defendant is incompetent to testify under oath in his own behalf at his
trial. Another Georgia statute [GA. CODE ANN. § !18-415 (1954)] does allow a defendant
to make an unswom statement, but the statement is not treated as evidence or like
the testimony of ordinary sworn witnesses; nor (as the Georgia courts have interpreted
it) may counsel examine his client on direct examination except in the discretion of
the trial judge.
In Ferguson, appellant's lawyer called him to the stand, but the trial judge sustained
the prosecutor's objection to his lawyer's attempt to guide him by asking questions.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, reiterating that "counsel for the accused cannot, as a matter of right, ask the accused questions or make suggestions to him when
he is making his statement to the court and jury." 215 Ga. 117, 119, 109 S.E.2d 44,
46-47 (1959). Appellant did not challenge the constitutionality of the incompetency
statute itself, but only the Georgia courts' construction of the statute permitting the
accused to make an unswom statement. As interpreted, contended appellant, he was
denied "the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him," as
required by Powell v. Alabama. The Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Brennan, agreed.
Although appellant was charged with a crime punishable by death, the Court explicitly declined to limit the holding to capital cases: "[I]n effectuating the provisions
of [the statute authorizing unswom statements], Georgia, consistently with the Fourteenth
Amendment, could not, in the context of [the incompetency statute], deny appellant the
right to have his counsel question him to elicit his statement. • • • Our decision does
not tum on the facts that the appellant was tried for a capital offense and was represented by employed counsel. The command of the Fourteenth Amendment also
applies in the case of an accused tried for a non-capital offense, or represented by
appointed counsel. For otherwise, in Georgia, 'the right to be heard by counsel would
be of little worth.' Chandler v. Fretag." !165 U.S. at 596.
32 Id. at 594.
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none but the most cool and self-possessed could place himself with
much prospect of coming out unharmed." 83
Why is it-how can it be-that the "tensions of a trial" assume constitutional magnitude only when the accused is fortunate enough to have his own lawyer? Again, what is it about the
quality of indigency that invests one so humbled with the coolness
and self-possession that his richer or luckier fellow-defendants lack?

Q. I am astounded at the mileage you manage to get out of
Chandler and Ferguson. As you yourself have pointed out, these
cases simply reaffirm and apply the language in Powell v. Alabama,
decided ten years before the Betts case. If the Powell language
didn't prevent formulation of the Betts rule in the first place, why
should post-Betts approval and application of the Powell language
warrant overruling that decision twenty years later?
A. The Betts case itself did not reaffirm the language in Powell
about defendant's unqualified right to be heard through his own
counsel. Indeed, by implication at least, Betts seems to modify
significantly the Powell language to this effect. The whole thrust
of Betts is that in applying the concept of due process we should
avoid "the danger of falling into the habit of formulating the
guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules"; 34 yet Chandler and
Ferguson apply just such a rule. The appropriate question, Betts
tells us, is not simply whether there was "want of counsel in a
particular case"; but whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, such "want" rendered the trial "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right." 815 Yet Chandler
and Ferguson well illustrate that want of one's own counsel in
any case, at any stage, on any issue, constitutes a per se violation
of "fundamental fairness."
Coming after Powell, as they do, Chandler and Ferguson are
not surprising-if you forget that Betts was handed down in the
interim. That's my problem. It's one thing to view the right to
one's own counsel as unqualified in Powell-before Betts was ever
written. It's quite another thing to reaffirm and apply this principle in Chandler and Ferguson-just as if Betts were never
written.
33 Id. at 595, quoting with approval Cooley,
519 (1865).
34 316 U.S. at 462.
85 Id. at 473.

J.,

in Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 511,
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Your comments to the contrary, notwithstanding, I have not
yet gotten as much mileage out of Chandler and Ferguson as I
might. You see, not only can't I square these cases with the Betts
rule, but I consider them a fortiori reasons for overruling Betts.
If it is difficult to see why an indigent defendant needs a lawyer
less than other defendants, it is easy to see why he needs one more.
Suppose all defendants, rich and poor alike, were denied counsel.
Some could hire investigators. Many more, on their own, could
probably locate and interview one or more potential defense witnesses. Not so with the indigent defendant. The deficiencies of
the bail system will operate to deprive most of them even of their
physical freedom prior to trial.36 Thus, not only will they be
unable to pour any money into the search for evidence, but,
however ill-equipped they are to do so, most of them "will also
be unable to throw themselves into the search."37
Moreover, if it is difficult to see why "the tensions of a trial"
render an uncounselled, indigent defendant less "unfit to give his
explanation properly and completely" than a defendant such as
Ferguson who does have the aid of counsel at all other phases of
the case, it is easy to see why the former is likely to experience
much greater tensions. After all, Ferguson had the guiding hand
of counsel most of the time. His lawyer undoubtedly interviewed
him, investigated the facts, researched the law, and went over his
client's version of the case with him-all this, before he took the
stand. Nevertheless, the Court seemed to agree that "when the
average defendant is placed in the witness chair and told . . .
that nobody can ask him any questions, and that he may make
such statement to the jury as he sees proper in his own defense,
he has been set adrift in an uncharted sea with nothing to guide
him." 38 The Court also seemed to share the view that notwithstanding his considerable legal assistance prior to taking the stand,
"an innocent man, charged with a heinous offence, and against
whom evidence of guilt has been given is much more likely to be
overwhelmed by his situation, and embarrassed, when called upon
for explanation, than the offender, who is hardened in guilt; and
36 See generally ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 112, 129-31
(1947); Samuels, Bail: Justice for Far from All, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1962, § 6 (Magazine),
p. 13; Note, 106 U. PA- L. REv. 693 (1958) {New York study); Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv.
1031 (1954) (Philadelphia study).
37 Kamisar, supra note 2, at 64-65.
38 365 U.S. at 593, quoting with approval from Gray, The Defendant's Statement,
7 GA. B.J. 432, 433 (1945). (Emphasis added.)
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... it will not be surprising if his explanation is incoherent, or if it
overlooks important circumstances."39
How much more frightening, more perilous, is the predicament of the defendant who has no lawyer to consult with before
he takes the stand-who is "going it alone" all the way?

Q. Come, come, the rational distinction between granting the
defendant who can afford it an absolute right to counsel and requiring the defendant who cannot to show "special circumstances"
is readily apparent. You need only keep in mind that the disadvantage suffered by the uncounselled indigent is "not imposed
by the state, but results from the financial situation in which
[he] ... finds himself." 40 There is all the difference in the world
between warning the state that its officers must refrain from interfering with the exercise of the right to counsel and requiring the
state affirmatively to provide counsel.41
A. Your emphasis on the lack of direct state responsibility for
a Betts would be well placed if we were dealing with, say, the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Although the
amount of mental anguish and physical pain is identical in both
situations, an abortive electrocution which results from unforeseen mechanical difficulties does not bar a second try, 42 whereas
"death by installments" 43 deliberately staged by prison officials in
order to torture the condemned man undoubtedly would violate
due process. Again, you would be right if we were considering,
say, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Absent "collusion,"44 I take it that Mapp v. Ohio does not prevent
89 365 U.S. at 595-96, quoting with approval Cooley, J., in Annis v. People, 13 Mich.
511, 519-20 (1865). (Emphasis added.)
40 McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 155 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951)
(financial inability of defendant to retain his own psychiatrist does not constitute denial
of equal protection).
41 Cf. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10
(1956).
42 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). The four dissenters
adopted what Professor Edmond Cahn has called a "consumer perspective," i.e., the
Court should view the matter not with an "imperial or official perspective" but from
the standpoint of "a consumer of government and law," in this instance, the criminal
defendant. See CAHN, THE PREDICAMENT OF DEMOCRATIC MAN 17-42 (1961), particularly
at 29-32, 37-39.
43 To borrow a phrase from Mr. Justice Burton's dissent in Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, supra note 42, at 474.
44 Until its abolition in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), considerable
temptation to and opportunity for federal-state collusion was furnished by the "silver
platter" doctrine in search and seizure cases, i.e., the doctrine that evidence illegally
seized by state police can be used in federal prosecutions if the searching officers had
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a prosecutor from using relevant physical evidence wrongfullyeven forcibly-seized by private citizens.45
In other words, the extent to which the state has "affirmatively"
no "working arrangement" with federal authorities but simply handed the evidence
over to them on a "silver platter." See generally Kamisar, supra note 4, at 1165-90.
These dangers still exist in other areas. For example, absent proof of a "working
arrangement," federal agents may elicit incriminating statements from federal suspects
held illegally by state or city police. Coppola v. United States, 365 U.S. 762 (1961),
affirming per curiam 281 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1960); Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S.
350 (1943). For a discussion of Coppola-type illegal detentions and the McNabb-Mallory
rule, see Kamisar, supra at 1183-85.
To some extent these dangers are posed by the decision in Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465 (1921), that so long as the United States did not have a hand in the
invasion of defendant's privacy, it may retain for use in federal prosecutions evidence
wrongfully seized by private individuals. While the magnitude of the problem of
private-federal collaboration is evidently much smaller than that of state-federal collaboration, it could become quite significant with the emergence of a powerful aggressive organization along the order of the American Protective League of World War I
or the Anti-Saloon League of prohibition days. See generally Black, Burdeau v.
McDowell-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 12 B.U.L. REv. 32 (1932).
45 It is difficult to see how or why Mapp impairs the rule of Burdeau v. McDowell
discussed in note 44 supra. Mapp simply applies the federal rule of e.xclusion to the
states, and the right of privacy effectuated by the federal rule has long been viewed
"as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority and . . . not . • . a limitation upon other than governmental agencies," 256 U.S. at 475. Cf. Sackler v. Sackler,
16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N.Y.S.2d 61 (evidence obtained by a private individual in
violation of state statute prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures admissible in
his civil action), reversing 33 Misc. 2d 600, 224 N.Y.S.2d 790 (Sup. Ct. 1962). The lower
court decision, relying on Mapp for its formulation of a new exclusionary rule, is
criticized in 46 MINN. L. REv. lll9 (1962); llO u. PA. L. REv. 1043 (1962); 8 UTAH L.
REv. 84 (1962).
One of the student comments considers and rejects an analogy to Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948): "In Shelley the lower court was asked to compel a private citizen to
do an act which would be unconstitutional for the state to perform, whereas in the
instant case the court was merely asked to give evidentiary status to illegally seized
information." 46 MINN. L. REv. 1119, 1124-25 (1962).
"[T]he courts have consistently admitted evidence wrongfully acquired by private
individuals in both civil and criminal actions [citing many cases]. Until the present
decision [by the trial court in Sackler], the sole suggestion of a departure from this
practice had been the Michigan Supreme Court's 1958 statement in Lebel v. Swincicki
(354 Mich. 427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958)]-a wrongful death action arising from an automobile accident-that it was error to admit testimony based on the analysis of a blood
sample taken from the defendant in violation of a Michigan constitutional prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures." ll0 U. PA. L. REv. 1043, 1044 (1962).
It can be-and has been-argued that there is more to be said for excluding evidence illegally seized by private persons in a civil suit than in a criminal prosecution:
"Individuals may feel that committing a minor criminal trespass and even possibly
suffering a small criminal penalty is far outweighted by the hope of obtaining crucial
evidence for a civil trial of major significance. In addition, one who establishes a civil
claim by securing evidence unlawfully, directly benefits from his own wrongdoing,
whereas in criminal convictions the primary benefit flows not to the party committing
the wrong, but to the public as a whole." 8 UTAH L. REv. 84, 87 (1962). However, the
Supreme Court has drawn a constitutional distinction between "civil"--even "quasicriminal"-proceedings on the one hand and "criminal" prosecutions on the other,
applying the fourth amendment only to "criminal" defendants. See Kamisar, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 891, 918-21 (1960).
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or "directly" contributed to the defendant's plight is most significant when we deal with a criminal procedural due process value
other than the reliability of the guilt-affixing process, one aptly
described as "insuring respect for the dignity of the individual." 46
But when we consider the right to counsel problem, we are talking about the "fairness" of the guilt-determining process itself;
we are addressing ourselves to the goal of "reducing to a minimum
the possibility that any innocent individual will be punished."47
The degree to which the state is "affirmatively" or "directly" responsible for the impairment of this due process value is hardly
crucial. Whether or not the state did something or failed to do
something, an unfair trial is still an unfair trial.

Q. An interesting theory. It's a pity there are so many Supreme Court cases against you.
A. Really?

Q. Certainly. "Fairness," i.e., preserving the integrity of the
guilt-determining process, entitles the accused to be "free of the
damaging and untrustworthy influence of coerced confessions and
testimony knowingly perjured." 48 Let's pause a moment to consider these cases.
It is by no means clear that a confession "coerced by private
persons, without color of state action, and introduced in evidence
by the state" 49 offends due process. Indeed, in an incisive concurring opinion handed down a decade ago, Justice Jackson,
joined by Justice Frankfurter, voiced relief that "there is no need
to resolve such difficult questions" as whether (absent "collusion"
between law enforcement officials of both jurisdictions) the courts
of one state may admit into evidence a coerced confession secured
by the police of another state.50 If your analysis is sound, why the
hesitation, the doubts? Whoever extracted the coerced confession
-local police, officials of a foreign jurisdiction, or a vigilante
committee-a coerced confession exerts the same "untrustworthy
influence," does it not?
A. It is difficult to visualize a case where neither the police
Kadish, supra note 26, at 347.
Id. at 346.
48 Ibid.
49 A hypothetical raised in Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence,
64 HARV. L. REv. 1304, 1310 (1951).
50 Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 70 (1951).
46
47
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nor the prosecution have any reason to suspect that the confession
on which the State relies was coerced by private parties. It is
almost impossible to conceive of such a case, after the defendant
raises this objection at the trial. Of course, if representatives of
the state are unaware of the defendant's mistreatment, and they
remain in the dark because he fails to alert them, i.e., he does
not object to the admission of the confession, the conviction should
be sustained. Defendant had his chance in court and chose not to
raise the point.

Q. When are you going to stop fighting the problem long
enough to come up with an answer?
A. I am simply pointing out that the only reason the situation
you hypothesize poses any "problem" at all is that it has not arisen
and is quite unlikely to arise.

Q. Let's take a case where, unbeknown to the State, members
of the Ku Klux Klan are holding defendant's wife and child as
hostages. Since they threaten to kill his dear ones if he repudiates
a confession they beat out of him earlier, again unbeknown to
the State, defendant does not object to the admission of the evidence.
A. I answer unhesitatingly that if those facts can be established
the conviction must fall. Interest has focused on whether the
"police methods" approach (i.e., coerced confessions should be
excluded in order to deter improper police methods in obtaining
the confessions) may operate to exclude confessions extracted by
the State which have been sufficiently corroborated to satisfy the
"trustworthiness" test. Regardless, the converse is certainly true.
It may be my shortcoming, but this one is so easy it's hardly worth
talking about. After all, I suppose nobody has suggested that the
"police methods" test has displaced the "trustworthiness" test; the
dispute has turned simply on whether the newer test has supplemented the older one.
Two years after Justice Jackson raised the self-styled "difficult
question" you referred to a moment ago, he furnished, it seems
to me, a resounding answer:
"[R]eliance on a coerced confession vitiates a conviction because such a confession combines the persuasiveness of apparent conclusiveness with what judicial experience shows to be
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illusory and deceptive evidence. A forced confession is a
false foundation for any conviction . . . ." 51
Whether or not you share Jackson's view that "untrustworthiness" is or ought to be the sole basis for excluding a confessionand, as I have already observed, a majority of the present Court
certainly does not-how can you quarrel with the proposition
that a challenged confession must at least pass this test?

Q. Is a coerced confession a "false foundation for any conviction" when private citizens have elicited it? Suppose, in the Ku
Klux Klan hypothetical I gave you, the confession was wrung from
the defendant by stark physical violence, but even apart from this,
evidence of guilt is overwhelming, e.g., twenty bishops witnessed
the crime and so testified. Under those circumstances, does the
use of the confession still warrant reversal?
A. I would have to say, probably not.

Q. Fine. I think this is a fatal concession on your part, but
I'll come back to it later. First, I want to trot out the perjury
cases. Here, there is no room for speculation about the necessity
of state complicity. The law is clear and it is hopelessly against
you.
You will recall that Professor Kadish is careful to allude-as
he must-to the impairment of the guilt-determining process by
the use of "testimony knowingly perjured," 52 i.e., false testimony
induced by or known to be such by the prosecution. Ever since
Mooney v. Holohan, 53 when the effect of perjured testimony was
first presented as a due process problem, it has been clear that
more than the mere use of such tainted testimony is needed to
violate the federal constitution:
"[T]he requirement of due process ... cannot be deemed to
be satisfied . . . if a State has contrived a conviction . . .
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction . . . is as
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is
the obtaining of a like result by intimidation. And the action of prosecuting officers on behalf of the State, like that
51
52
53

Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 192 (1953).
See text at note 48 supra. (Emphasis added.)
294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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of administrative officers in the execution of its laws, may
constitute state action within the purview of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 114
The real controversy in this area has turned on whether
the introduction of perjured testimony violates due process only
when obtained, as a majority of the Court, per Justice Frankfurter,
put it in Hysler v. Florida115 twenty years ago, "by the active conduct or the connivance of the prosecution," 56 or whether inducement or knowledge by some other state official suffices. A recent
Third Circuit holding that deliberate perjury by a police officer
offends due process57 has been described-by a "liberal" commentator-as a "somewhat novel decision." 58 Why? Because no
member of the prosecution staff was aware of the false testimony.
This should give you some idea of the uphill struggle you face.
A. The only thing I find surprising about the Third Circuit
decision is that there is any doubt about it. Throughout his
Hysler opinion, Justice Frankfurter uses "responsible officials,"
"state authorities" and "responsible state officials" interchangeably
with "prosecutor" ;59 the unanimous opinion by Justice Murphy
in Pyle v. Kansas, 60 handed down the very next Term, does likewise;61 the Mooney case itself, you will recall, spoke of "state action" generally and regarded the action of prosecutors as well as
"administrative officers"-presumably police officers-as "state action."62 In any event, the matter seems to have been settled by
the recent case of Napue v. Illinois, 63 where the Chief Justice
formulated the Mooney-Hysler-Pyle rule as banning convictions
"obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by
representatives of the State."64 Quite significantly, the only lower
federal court authority cited in direct support of this proposition
was the "somewhat novel" Third Circuit decision.
IH

Id. at 112-13. (Emphasis added.)

55 315 U.S. 411 (1942).
56 Id. at 413.
57 Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
58 Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for

358 U.S. 948 (1959).
State Prisoners, 108
U. PA. L. REv. 461, 483 (1960). Considering the state of the law, this description of
Curran is warranted; it does not connote disapproval of the case by Professor Reitz.
59 315 U.S. at 413, 418, 421.
60 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
61 Id. at 214, 216.
6!? See text at note 54 supra.
63 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
64. Id. at 269. (Emphasis added.)
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Q. The matter is far from settled. Indeed, the weight of authority is against the Third Circuit.65 But I see no point in prolonging this skirmish simply to avoid the main battle. Whether
or not complicity of the prosecutor is a necessary condition to the
finding of unconstitutionality, it is quite clear-you yourself have
said as much-that the complicity of some state official is a prerequisite. What about that? How can you possibly square this
"state action" requirement (however you define it) with the rationale you advanced a while back? Whether the State solicited
the false testimony-or the enemies of the defendant did-or the
friends of the victim-whether or not the State knew at the time
that the testimony was false-isn't the guilt-determining process
equally impaired by the use of perjured testimony?
A. A well-established rule that the use of false testimony induced by or known to be such by the State violates due process
hardly signifies it is equally well established that absent State complicity the use of such testimony does not and cannot offend due
process. The Supreme Court has never so held.

Q. Yes it has, in denying petitioner coram nobis relief m
Hysler.
A. Despite the fact H ysler did allege that false testimony was
induced by the prosecution? 66 There is considerable language in
the opinion which supports your reading of the case. However,
when you consider that the petition evidently relied on "conclusions" rather than "specific facts," as Florida law required; 67 and
that the Florida Supreme Court passed on the credibility of the
allegations and found "'Hysler's proof' ... insufficient 'to make
the showing of substantiality which, according to the local procedure . . . was necessary in order to obtain the extraordinary
relief . . . ,' " 68 you can see why the case may appropriately be
isolated and all but forgotten. The Court seems to have done
precisely that when, quite recently, it looked back at Hysler as
holding "only that a state standard of specificity and substantiality
65 See, e.g., Wild v. Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1951); Holt v. United States,
303 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1962) (alternative holding); United States v. Jakalski, 237 F.2d
503 (7th Cir. 1956) (alternative holding).
66 See 315 U.S. at 413, 421; and the excerpts from Hysler's petition in the appendix
to Mr. Justice Black's dissenting opinion. Id. at 428.
61 Id. at 416.
68 As Mr. Justice Black pointed out in his dissent; id. at 424.
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in making allegations of federal constitutional deprivations would
be respected." 69

Q. Yes, but the "insubstantiality" of the allegations was based
on a "proper skepticism" that state authorities either induced or
knew of any false testimony.70
A. And also on a wider skepticism-considering the corroborating testimony "both of numerous witnesses and Hysler himself,"71 "the fact that this repudiation came four years after leadenfooted justice had reached the end of the familiar trail of dilatory
procedure," 72 "that repudiations and new incriminations like Baker's on the eve of execution are not unfamiliar as a means of
relieving others or as an irrational hope for self," 73 and other factors-that any testimony was false at all.
Even if I am wrong about Hysler, it is not amiss to note that
1942 was a long, long time ago, as constitutional-criminal procedure goes. Since then, federal constitutional protection afforded
state defendants against transgressing local law enforcement officials has expanded rapidly. 74 Much more in keeping with the current outlook of the Supreme Court than Hysler is the four-man
dissent in Durley v. Mayo. 75 Petitioner Durley alleged that his
conviction rested on perjured testimony which was a product not
of "state action" but of a private agreement between his two codefendants. 76 A majority of the Court concluded that the state
court's denial of Durley's petition may have rested on an adequate
state ground, and thus dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. But the
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1960).
See 315 U.S. at 418-20.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 417.
73 Id. at 422.
74 See generally Allen, supra note 21; Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court,
N.Y. Times, June 17, 1962, § 6 (Magazine), p. 7; Schaefer, supra note 41; Traynor, Mapp
v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319.
Moreover, a rule upsetting "private perjury" state convictions would add to federalstate friction, but a rule invalidating state convictions of uncounselled indigents would
soon remove a federal-state irritant. Since the prosecution, by definition, is unaware of
the "private perjury," a rule vitiating convictions so obtained could not obviate the
problem, but would undoubtedly encourage litigation, especially by means of collateral
attack. The "private perjury" cases are "sick" cases which a legal system cannot wholly
avoid. Not so prosecutions of uncounselled indigent defendants. This can be put to
an end by a rule which invalidates the resulting convictions. Here, a prophylactic rule
can be fully effective.
711 351 U.S. 277 (1956).
76 Petitioner's allegations are discussed in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion.
Id. at 286-87.
61l

70
71
12

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

four dissenters had little trouble in finding a violation of due
process once the merits of the case were reached. 77

Q. Yes, because the testimony of the co-defendants "was the
only evidence linking petitioner with the crimes charged"; 78
because, disregarding the alleged false testimony, "no competent
evidence remains to support the conviction." 79 What result if
there had been ample untainted evidence to support the verdict of
guilty?
A. I would have to say that an affirmance would be in order.

Q. Fine. One more question. Would ample untainted evidence also warrant an affirmance if the perjured testimony were
induced by or knowingly used by the prosecution?
A. I think not. Although this question has never authoritatively been answered, I think that here, as in the coerced
confession cases, 80 the mere use of such untainted evidence-regardless of other evidence of guilt-would necessitate reversal. Although the Court did not employ such terminology in the recent
perjury case of Napue v. Illinois, what it did in that case, it seems
to me, was to move to the very brink of a "rule of automatic
reversal.'' 81

Q. Yes, the automatic rule the Court applies when a confession coerced by state officials has been introduced into evidence,
but-as you agreed awhile back-not one it would apply if the
confession were coerced by private citizens.
A. That's right. Where there is no complicity on the part of
the State, the weight of the whole record might make the use of
Id. at 290-91.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 291.
See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 621 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945). See generally
Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and
Jury, 21 u. CHI. L. REv. 317, 339-54 (1954).
81 See text at notes 101-02 infra. See also Magruder, C.J., concurring in Coggins v.
O'Brien, 188 F.2d 130, 139 (1st Cir. 1951): "I take it that a constitutional claim is not
to be defeated merely because there may have been other evidence, untainted, sufficient
to warrant a conviction~ that the burden is not on the petitioner to show a probability
that in the jury's deliberations the perjured evidence tipped the scales in favor of conviction. If the prosecutor is not content to rely on the untainted evidence, and chooses
to 'button up' the case by the known use of perjured testimony, an ensuing conviction
cannot stand, and there is no occasion to speculate upon what the jury would have
done without the perjured testimony before it."
77
78
79
80
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perjured testimony or even an "involuntary" confession nonprejudicial, e.g., where your twenty bishops have testified impressively
on the same matter.

Q. Why do you qualify your answer by excepting "complicity
on the part of the State"? Why this double standard? Isn't the
efject on the guilt-determining process the same, regardless of the
source of responsibility for the tainted testimony? Don't you
see, the perjured testimony and involuntary confession cases completely obliterate the sharp distinction you drew earlier between
the due process value of "insuring respect for the dignity of the
individual" and the value of "reducing to a minimum the possibility that any innocent individual will be punished." 82 The perjury and confession cases amply demonstrate that regardless of
which value is at stake, the degree to which the state is "affirmatively" or "directly" responsible for the plight of the accused is
crucial.
Even if you are right, even if the use of coerced confessions or
perjured testimony may violate due process, whether or not the
state had a hand in the sorry business, what comfort is this to
you? So long as you admit that such error will not necessarily
require reversal-this will depend on the overall record-whereas
if the state is to blame the error will invariably necessitate reversal,
where does this get you? Nowhere, but right back to Betts v.
Brady. After all, when the state is not responsible for defendant's
"want of counsel," such disadvantage also may violate due process
-again depending upon the whole record.
A. The next thing I know you'll be telling me Betts marks
a great advance in criminal procedure, because it settles this point,
whereas it remains to be authoritatively established in the confession and perjury fields.

Q. I was getting there.
A. I must admit the argument you put forth has a certain
appeal-at first sight. Too bad that a second, closer look finds
it illusory and deceptive.

Q. You don't say?
A. The fallacy lies in lumping together the activities of differ82 Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346-47 (1957).
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ent officials-police, prosecutors, judges and legislators-under the
single heading of "state action." For it makes a big difference
whether we are talking about the action of police or prosecutor
in particular, or state action generally.83 You see, the "rule of
automatic reversal" in the confession cases and, let us assume, the
perjury cases as well, does not illustrate the importance of state
conduct as much as it establishes the crucial nature of state misconduct, i.e., improper tactics by law enforcement officials.
Let me put it another way. As you might expect, methods
which offend "certain decencies of civilized conduct" 8i or which
the Court brands "repulsive" 85 are not often authorized by state
law. Rather, they typically constitute violations of local law, as
well as the federal constitution.
In this connection, it may be helpful to dwell on that famous
(or infamous) stomach-pumping case, Rochin v. California. 86 The
conviction was reversed only because of offensive police methods.
The case may be viewed as a "pure" example of disrespect for
man's "dignity" or "privacy" or "individuality," 87 for it is hard
to see how the police misconduct posed any threat to the integrity
of the guilt-determining process whatsoever. "[I]t is possible for
real evidence to be placed in a house without the occupant's approval or his knowledge, but it would take a rash man indeed to
try to disassociate himself from the contents of his stomach." 88
Most procedural due process cases, however, are "hybrids."
This is true of the perjured testimony and coerced confession
cases generally. Here, typically two factors work together to top•
pie the conviction: the disputed evidence is unreliable and it is
the fruit of blameworthy conduct on the part of police or prose•
cutor. When you remove one factor from the equation, as you
have done by positing cases where law enforcement officials cannot
be blamed for either the acquisition or use of the tainted evidence,
83 Not, however, if the "consumer perspective" were the prevailing one. See the
discussion in note 42 supra.
Bi Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
85 In Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954), which saw a 5-4 majority uphold a
conviction based on incriminating conversations heard via a concealed microphone il•
legally installed in petitioner's home, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, author of the Rochin
opinion, in his dissent protested: "[W]hat is decisive here, as in Rochin, is additional
aggravating conduct which the Court finds repulsive." Id. at 144-45. For a penetrating
and delightful discussion of the Irvine case, see Westin, The Supreme Court, in THE
USES OF POWER 117-70 (Westin ed. 1962).
86 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
87 See the discussion of this due process value-goal in Kadish, supra note 82, at 347
ss Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and
Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083, 1120 (1959).
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then isn't it readily apparent that a greater impairment of the
guilt-determining process is needed to "bring the result below
the Plimsoll line of 'due process' "? 80 Even if the Court were not
to apply the "rule of automatic reversal" when law enforcement
officials extract and use "involuntary" confessions, even if it does
not invoke such a principle to cover those cases where there is
state responsibility for the use of perjured testimony, it is easy
to see why a lower probability that such tainted evidence will convict an innocent person suffices when police-prosecutor misconduct
is present than when it is not.

Q. I would be much more impressed with this analysis if the
Court had made use of it. But the reason for "the rule of automatic reversal" is to be found elsewhere. Justice Whittaker observed for the Court:
"(The prosecution] suggests that, apart from the confession,
there was adequate evidence before the jury to sustain the
verdict. But where, as here, a coerced confession constitutes
a part of the evidence before the jury and a general verdict
is returned, no one can say what credit and weight the jury
gave to the confession."90
Note well that no significance at all is attached to the presence
or absence of law enforcement misconduct. Whether or not state
officials extracted the confession, whether or not the prosecution
knew about it, the reasoning is equally applicable.
A. Come, come. There wouldn't be much fun or profit in
. this business if we were confined to what courts say, and were not
free to consider what they do. The Court has been reluctant to
spell out that the function of the "automatic reversal" rule involves
disciplining of police-prosecutor activity, perhaps because of loud
cries that the courts should not "police the police." 91 But this is
89 Cf. Frankfurter, J., concurring in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 196, 199 (1955). The
"plimsoll line" is the load line on the sides of British merchant vessels, to indicate the
line of submergence permitted by law. It can be argued that "above" rather than
"below" the plimsoll line more aptly describes that due process has not been satisfied,
but there is ample authority for describing an overloaded ship as one loaded below the
plimsoll mark. See generally Field, Frankfurter, ]., Concurring, 71 HARv. L. REv. 77, 80
n.18 (1957).
90 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958).
01 See, e.g., Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand,
53 J. CRIM. L., C. &: P. S. 85 (1962); Inbau, More About Public Safety v. Individual Civil
Liberties, 53 J. CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 329 (1962); McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An IllConceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. 8: P. S. 266 (1961); Peterson,
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what the Court is doing. The only good reason for overturning a
conviction whenever a coerced confession is introduced at the trial
-even though the testimony of your twenty bishops covers the
same matter-is to be found in the "police ·methods" rationale
which now underlies the constitutional ban against coerced confessions.92
This is well illustrated by Stein v. New Y ork,93 where a majority, per Justice Jackson, the leading antagonist of the "police
methods" or "deterrent" approach to coerced confessions,94 took
some healthy swings at the "automatic reversal" principle.911 This
greatly distressed several members of the Court, notably Justice
Frankfurter, champion of the "deterrent" approach to confessions.96
Alarmed at what he feared was a "retrogressive step in the
administration of criminal justice," Justice Frankfurter in his dissent cast aside the fictions and articulated the real reason-and
the best reason-for the "automatic reversal" principle:
"By its change of direction the Court affords new inducement
to police and prosecutors to employ the third degree, whose
use the Wickersham Commission found 'widespread' more
than thirty years ago . . . .
"It surely is not self-deluding or boastful to believe that
the series of cases in which this Court reversed convictions
because of such abuses helped to educate public opinion and
to arouse in prosecutors and police not only a wholesome fear
but also a more conscientious feeling against resort to these
lazy, brutal methods. . . .
"But if law officers learn that from now on they can
coerce confessions without risk, since trial judges may admit
such confessions provided only that, perhaps through the very
process of extorting them, other evidence has been procured
Restrictions in the Law of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 46 (1957); Waite, Judges
and the Crime Burden, 54 MICH. L. REv. 169 (1955). But see Kamisar, Some Reflections
on Criticizing the Courts and "Policing the Police," 53 J. CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 453 (1962).

92

Cf. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv.

411, 426-27 (1954).
93 346 U.S. 156 (1953).

94 See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 58, 60 (1949) Gackson, J., concurring in
the result in Watts and dissenting in the companion cases of Harris v. South Carolina
and Turner v. Pennsylvania).
9lS 346 U.S. at 189-92.
96 See, e.g., his opinions for the majority in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41
(1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
50 n.2 (1949).
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on which a conviction can be sustained, police in the future
even more so than in the past will take the easy but ugly
path of the third degree." 97
Fortunately, Justice Frankfurter's hopes turned out to be
sounder than his fears. Justice Jackson's language in Stein did
mark only "a temporary, perhaps an ad hoc, deviation from a long
course of decisions," 98 after all. But make no mistake about it.
If Jackson's views had prevailed, we would indeed have witnessed
a "retrogressive step."
It would seem that a prosecutor is significantly more sensitive
to reversal on appeal than a policeman.99 Thus, the real damage
which would have been wrought by an abandonment of the "automatic reversal" principle would not have been a dilution of
the deterrent effect of the confession doctrines on the police, considerable though this might have been, as much as the immeasurable diminution of the force of these doctrines on the prosecution:
"Under such circumstances the problem for the prosecution
concerned about reversal would not be to avoid the use of
coerced confessions but only to insure their verification by
independent evidence. The prosecution might then be encouraged to supplement other evidence by introducing a coerced confession in order to guarantee a conviction. On review, it could defend the conviction on the ground that it
was warranted by the independent evidence."100
When, as I think it will do sooner or later, the Court authoritatively establishes that the knowing use of perjured testimony
likewise "automatically" works a reversal, it may not explicitly
base such a doctrine on the "disciplinary" or "deterrent" feature
of procedural due process. For example, it may say instead that
even where the falsehood only bears upon the credibility of a
single witness, and the State may point to much "untainted" tes346 U.S. at 201·03.
Frankfurter, J., dissenting, id. at 201. Doubts raised by Stein have been put to
rest by Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
324 (1959); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 621 (1961) (majority opinion by
Frankfurter, J.),
99 See Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 Iu..
L. REY. 442, 461-62 (1948); Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52 Nw. U.L. REY. 77, 78 (1957); Waite, supra note 91, at 194. Rules of evidence
do significantly influence police attitudes and practices when the courts make the attorney general or district attorney care enough to make the police care too. See Kamisar,
Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM L.,
C. Be P. S. I71, 179-82 (1962).
100 Meltzer, supra note 80, at 354.
97
98

242

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

timony to the same effect, so many "subtle factors" are operating,
that one can never be sure that the testimony of that one witness
did not have an effect on the outcome of the trial.101
This reasoning may ring true for many cases, even most, but
it simply does not warrant reversal in all cases where perjured
testimony is knowingly used, however overwhelming the other
untainted evidence. It does not satisfactorily explain upsetting a
conviction when, for example, the perjured testimony is confirmed
in every respect by the testimony of twenty bishops. Whatever
the Court's linguistics when and if it formulates a rule of "automatic reversal" in the perjury cases, whether or not it will dwell
on the police or prosecutor misconduct in the case, misconduct
by officers of the law will nevertheless be the decisive factor.
Whether or not the Court spells it out, the true rationale will
nevertheless run along the lines of Judge Fuld's recent opinion
for a unanimous New York Court of Appeals:
"The administration of justice must not only be above reproach, it must also be beyond the suspicion of reproach.
The prosecutor should have corrected the trial testimony
given by Mantzinos and the impression it created. . . .
"It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the
witness' credibility rather than directly upon defendant's
guilt. A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is
in any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the
responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false
and elicit the truth. Nor does it avail respondent to contend
that defendant's guilt was clearly established or that disclosure would not have changed the verdict. . . . We may not
close our eyes to what occurred; regardless of the quantum
of guilt or the asserted persuasiveness of the evidence, the
episode may not be overlooked. That the district attorney's
silence was not the result of guile or a desire to prejudice
matters little, for its impact was the same, preventing, as it
did, a trial that could in any real sense be termed fair." 102
101 Cf. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959): "The principle that a State may
not knowingly use false evidence . . • to obtain a tainted conviction • • • does not
cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the
witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may
well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may
depend."
102 People v. Savvides, I N.Y.2d 554, 556-57, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854-55, 154 N.Y.S.2d
885, 887 (1956). Judge Fuld's italicized language siguifies the portion quoted with ap•
proval in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959). The word "fair" in the last
line, "preventing • • • a trial that could in any real sense be fair," is not without its
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Q. I fail to see where this analysis gets you. Even if you are
right, what have you accomplished other than to supply me with
a ready explanation for the absolute right to counsel when you
can afford it and the qualified right when you cannot? We must
not be content with what the Court said in Chandler and Ferguson any more than in the perjured testimony and coerced confession cases. Here, too, the linguistics about "prejudice" to the
contrary notwithstanding, the true rationale runs deeper. In
Betts, want of counsel posed a threat only to the reliability of the
guilt-determining process; in Chandler and Ferguson a second
factor was also at work: state interference with defendant's right
to have the assistance of his own counsel.
A. What do you mean by "state interference"? You conjure
up the spectacle of two husky assistant prosecutors double-teaming
defense counsel at the door to the courthouse. What are we really
talking about? In Chandler the trial judge denied petitioner's
request for a continuance to enable him to obtain counsel on the
"habitual criminal" accusation. In Ferguson, relying on many
state precedents to the effect that defense counsel cannot, as a
matter of right, guide his client when he is making his unsworn
statement, the trial judge sustained the State's objection to counsel's attempt to question the accused at this time. This hardly
calls for the "disciplinary" or "deterrent" feature of procedural
due process found in Rochin, Mapp, Mooney or Napue. This
is trial error, plain and simple. Not state misconduct in the sense
of the illegal search or coerced confession cases, or in any other
meaningful sense. Not a "rational basis" for distinguishing Betts
from Chandler the way "private" perjured testimony and coerced
confession cases can be distinguished from the "police-prosecutor"
variety.

Q. The lack of funds to find a missing document or discover
a missing witness also increases the possibility that an innocent
man may be convicted. "Want" of a hand-writing expert or a
ballistics expert or a chemist or a biologist also "impairs" the integrity of the guilt-determining process. Surely the federal constitution does not compel a state to furnish an indigent all these
aids, too.
ambiguity. In this context, I submit "fair" means not reliable or trustworthy but ''fair"
in the sense of "fair play," i.e., respect for certain decencies of civilized conduct whether
or not there is a substantial risk that an innocent man may be convicted.
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The "rational basis" you seek is all around you. It is supplied
by the contingencies of life itself. The state may not erect hurdles
in the path of an accused financially able to minimize the risk that
he will be wrongfully convicted. That's Chandler. But absent
"special circumstances" the state need not remove the financial
barriers confronting the indigent accused so the risk is minimized
for him too. That's Betts. It's not so much a question of the
presence of state action as it is the availability of private funds.
As Henry Cecil's registrar observed:
"You want a full-scale action, with counsel and solicitors on
both sides and all the rest of it, do you? That's what Magna
Carta gives you. . . . But it's expensive. Magna Carta says
nothing about not being expensive. To no one will we sellwell, there are no bribes in this country-to no one will we
deny-to no one will we delay, justice. Nothing about not
charging, is there?" 108
IL

Griffin v. Illinois: How

WIDE THE

HOLDING?

A. I'm not much of an authority on the Magna Carta. I do
know there's a good deal about "not charging" in Griffin v.
Illinois:
"Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged
with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an
equality before the bar of justice in every American court.' ...
In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.
Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could
not be used as an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair
trial . . . . [T]o deny adequate review to the poor means
that many of them may lose their life, liberty or property
because of unjust convictions which appellate courts would
set aside. . . . Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated
to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none
in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has."104

Q. This is not the first time Justice Black has "painted with
108 CECIL, DAUGHTERS IN LAW 117 (1961).
104 351 U.S. 12, 17-19 (1956) (opinion of Black,

J.).
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a broad brush." 105 He has also said-for a majority of the Court
-that the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense "is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment
deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and
liberty"; 100 that "if the constitutional safeguards it [the sixth
amendment] provides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.' " 107
If this isn't fourteenth amendment due process talk, I don't know
what is. But Black said this in a case holding only that an indigent
federal defendant has an absolute right to assigned counsel-and
four years later a majority of the Court decided the fourteenth
amendment due process question against him. 108 This illustrates
nicely that "the thing adjudged comes to us oftentimes swathed
in obscuring dicta, which must be stripped off and cast aside"; 109
that a rereading of an opinion with "due contrition" often reveals
"all sorts of cracks and crevices and loopholes.'' 110 Griffin, I venture to say, furnishes but another illustration.
Oh, I don't deny you can gain some solace from the language
in Griffin-if you take it out of context and read it "with the
literalness of a country parson interpreting the first chapter of
Genesis."m But surely you must agree that this language cannot
be taken literally. Persons charged with crimes always have and
always will "stand before the law with varying degrees of economic
and social advantage. Some can afford better lawyers and better
investigations of their cases. Some can afford bail, some cannot."112
Economic burdens attendant upon the exercise of a privilege
never have and never will bear equally upon all. "[W]hile the
exclusion of 'indigents' from a free state university would deny
them equal protection, requiring the payment of tuition fees
surely would not, despite the resulting exclusion of those who
could not afford to pay the fees.'' 113
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, so characterized Black's opinion. Id. at 34.
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
Ibid., quoting Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937):
"[I']he immunity from compulsory self-incrimination • • . might be lost, and justice
still be done."
108 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy dissenting.
109 CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 29 (1921).
110 Ibid.
111 Cf. BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL L\w: ROLE OF
THE SUPREME COURT 32 (1955).
112 Burton, J., dissenting in Griffin, 351 U.S. at 28-29.
113 Harlan, J., dissenting, id. at 35. Cf. Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 818 (1960), where, in an action for an alleged civil rights violation,
plaintiff unsuccessfully contended that imposition of an annual .$8 high school "enrollment fee" deprived her, inter alia, of equal protection of the laws.
105
106
101
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A. No doubt Griffin was "deprived" of a college education
and proper medical and dental care and many other services.
But"[B]asic legal services are not of the same order, in our theory
of government. . . . The provision of applied justice is an
essential function of the state even under the most conservative political theory.... A state which provides its citizens
with medical care we term a welfare state. It has extended
the role of government to provide for the social welfare of
its people.... But a state which "does no more than to provide all its citizens with applied justice is not extending the
role of government to novel fields but rather only giving all
men that which is the most basic function of government, the
provision of legal process."114
No doubt, too, even so far as legal services go, an indigent
defendant suffers many handicaps in defending against a criminal
charge, but "to recognize shortcomings ... is far from admitting
that they should furnish the excuse for enlarging or perpetuating
them." 115 The point made in connection with a Griffin's inability
to achieve full appellate review holds equally for a Bett's inability
to enjoy the benefit of counsel:
"In this respect the indigent defendant can be made to 'stand
on an equality before the bar of justice.' This Court should
most certainly give no sanction to a patent discrimination
against the indigent because it is powerless to eliminate all
of his disadvantages.'' 116
I confess I am not sure just how far Griffin goes. But I think
I do know this much. Wherever the outer boundaries be, the
availability of counsel falls well within them. Whatever else Griffin covers, it deals with the adequacy and effectiveness of appellate
review:
"No matter how intelligent or educated, a layman does not
have the know-how to analyze the evidence and evaluate it,
much less the special ability necessary to search out errors or
argue points of law, even if he happens to recognize them.
Thus, effective submission of an appeal requires more than
possession by the defendant of a transcript of the minutes of
114

43

Willcox &: Bloustein, The Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment,

CORNELL L.Q. 1, 16 (1957).
115 Brief for Petitioners, p.
116 Id. at 33.

32, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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the trial. Any kind of effective presentation demands the aid
of a lawyer. . . ."117
If you want a decent portrait painting, pigment, oil, brushes
and canvas help. But what good are they without an artist?
Now, surely the need for counsel prior to conviction and sentencing is far greater than at any post-conviction stage. Suppose
an accused were forced to choose between availing himself of legal
services at the trial or on appeal? Any doubt about his decision?
Indeed, is there much point-aside from teasing him-in affording
an indigent defendant adequate review, yet denying him the basic
tools with which to build the record to be reviewed?118

Q. I'm sorry, but you are still reading Griffin for much more
than it is worth. The case does not deal with the "adequacy" or
"effectiveness" of appellate review in the sense you use these
terms. Rather, it is concerned simply with the availability of
review.
Griffin's sad predicament was that under Illinois law he could
not obtain appellate review of alleged trial errors, e.g., admissibility and sufficiency of evidence, at all without furnishing the
appellate court with a bill of exceptions and he couldn't do this
without buying a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings.110 Oh, theoretically he could clear this hurdle by means of
"the so-called bystanders' bill of exceptions or the bill of exceptions prepared from someone's memory in condensed and narrative form and certified to by the trial judge," 120 but the State of
Illinois conceded that "nobody has heard of its ever being actually
used in a criminal case in Illinois in recent years.... There isn't
any way that an Illinois convicted person in a non-capital case
can obtain a bill of exceptions without paying for it." 121
117 Fuld, J., dissenting in People v. Breslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73, 81, 149 N.E.2d 85, 90, 172
N.Y.S.2d 157, 164 (1958).
118 See GELLHORN, AMERICAN RIGHTS 24 (1960) ("very close resemblance" between
Griffin and right-to-counsel case); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70
HARV. L. R.Ev. I, IO (1956) (Griffin "analogy to the right to counsel is close indeed');
Willcox & Bloustein, supra note 114, at 23 ("realistically," application of Griffin to
counsel cases "should be inevitable').
A Griffin-like argument was anticipated by two distinguished lawyers as soon as Betts
was handed down: "If defendants with means have the right to employ counsel to
represent them where accused of serious crime, it is difficult to maintain that indigent
persons are in fact accorded the equal protection of the laws when that right is denied
them because they are not in possession of funds." Letter from Benjamin V. Cohen
and Erwin N. Griswold to the Editor of the N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1942, § 4, p. 6E, col. 7.
110 351 U.S. at 13-16.
120 Id. at 14 n.4 .
121 Ibid.
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Thus, the Court was confronted with a rule which "effectively"
denied indigent defendants "full" or "adequate" appellate review
in a jurisdictional sense, not a qualitative one. Allegations with
respect to certain kinds of trial errors could not be considered at
all by an appellate court if petitioner were too poor to afford a
stenographic transcript. Again, in this jurisdictional sense, "there
can be no equal justice where the kind of trial or appeal a man
gets depends on the amount of money he has." 122
In this respect, Griffin's brief-which relies on and reasons
from the Betts rule-is most illuminating:
"In one notable area, the Court has been alert to prevent the
indigence of the defendant from prejudicing him before the
courts. A series of cases, beginning with Powell v. Alabama
. . . have made it clear that the States may not jeopardize
the right of a defendant to a fair trial by denying him counsel
simply because he cannot afford to retain counsel from his
own funds. The rule is not absolute, but it is prejudice to
the defendant which is the touchstone. That will not be permitted, and the circumstances in each case will be examined
to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the
failure of the State to make counsel available. Betts v.
Brady . . . .
"The very nature of the rule with respect to counsel
demonstrates the principle for which we contend. The indigent must not be prejudiced by his indigence. If the
Court, after examining the proceedings, is satisfied that justice has been done-that the indigent defendant who cannot
retain counsel has been accorded the same standard of justice as the defendant who retains his own counsel-the action
of the State will not be disturbed. Indigence remains, as it
should, 'a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance.'
"In contrast, here, the indigent is prejudiced. . . . Indigence is not neutral; it is the critical fact, the very basis upon
which defendants such as these petitioners are prevented from
securing the benefits of full appellate review of their conviction. . . .
"[T]he disadvantages of the impecunious defendant in the
trial court-with regard to bail, or to the inadequacies in
the presentation of his case, or to his sentence-are no doubt
compensated for in considerable degree by the trial judge.
At least, the opportunity for him to do so is always present.
Here, even were it so disposed, the Illinois Supreme Court
122

See text at note 104 supra. (Emphasis added.)
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is powerless to mitigate in any way the discrimination in appellate rights. Without a transcript of the evidence or a bill
of exceptions, no review of the proceeding in the trial court
is possible; it is simply and finally non-existent." 123
What more proof do you want that Betts is perfectly reconcilable with Griffin?
A. Come on! What did you expect Griffin's lawyer to do?
Urge the overruling of Betts in order to win his case? "In law, as
in war or football or even love, the direct frontal assault on a
prepared and fortified position is only rarely a successful maneuver. "124 A crusader might have attacked the Betts rule boldly,
but fortunately Griffin had a lawyer125-and he "distinguished the
offending precedent boldly."126
If I wanted to play your game, I could turn around and say
that the State of Illinois "conceded" that if Griffin won Betts
must fall, that Griffin is an a fortiori case for overruling Betts:
"Although this Court holds the right to counsel in capital
cases is absolute, it consistently holds that there is no such
categorical right in non-capital cases, it being necessary affirmatively to show 'substantial prejudice' by denial of the
right. . . .
"Yet there can be no doubt that throughout the civilized
world there is a far more profoundly 'felt necessity' for the
right to advocacy in that nisi prius hearing in which due process does guarantee the absolute right to counsel in capital
cases, the guaranty being contingent in non-capital cases upon
the affirmative showing of 'special circumstances,' than is any
'felt necessity' for appellate review, whether in capital or noncapital cases and whether absolute or contingent.
"The right to evidence is far more important than the
right to appellate review of that evidence! Indeed, without
evidence to be reviewed, review is usually futile. This, in
fact, is the very burden of petitioners' thesis; for they emphasize the need of a stenographic transcript to preserve such
evidence as is presented."127

Q. All right. Let's forget about the Griffin briefs. What about
Justice Black's opinion? He takes pains to point out:
123 Brief for Petitioners, pp. 30-33. (Emphasis added.)
124 WIENER, EFFECIIVE APPELLATE .ADVOCACY 89 (1950).
125 See id. at 232-34.
126 See id. at 112-13.
121 Brief for Illinois, pp. 5, 8.
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"We do not hold ... that Illinois must purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where a defendant cannot buy
it. The Supreme Court may find other means of affording
adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants. For example, it may be that bystanders' bills of exceptions or other methods of reporting trial proceedings could
be used in some cases."128
As Judge Qua has observed, these remarks suggest that "the
Griffin case provides a rule for transcripts parallel to that for counsel in Betts v. Brady-that transcripts must be provided if necessary to an adequate non-discriminatory appeal just as counsel must
be provided if necessary to an adequate hearing." 129
Look at it this way. A state could not condition the right to
deny guilt and stand trial on the presence of defense counsel and
then refuse to furnish counsel to those financially unable to hire
their own. This is Griffin. Nor, I take it, could a state condition,
say, the defense of insanity on the presence of some favorable
psychiatric testimony, yet not provide such experts when an indigent defendant attempts to raise this defense. Again, this is
Griffin. But so long as a defendant is allowed access to the courts
(whether or not he has a lawyer), and permitted to raise any defense a rich man can (whether or not he has the experts a rich man
can afford to hire), the equal protection clause does not entitle
him to a lawyer or an expert witness simply because it would be
"nice" or "helpful" to have one. He is entitled to such aids only
if otherwise the criminal proceedings are "so apt to result in injustice as to be fundamentally unfair." 130 This is the Betts rule.
I need not dwell on expert witnesses. The same point holds
true for witnesses generally. Not only can't an indigent defendant
track down a potential defense witness at government expense,
12s 351 U.S. at 20. Consider, too, Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent: "Is an indigent
defendant, who has not shown that he is unable to obtain full appellate review of his
conviction by a narrative bill of exceptions, constitutionally entitled to the added ad•
vantage (emphasis added) of a free transcript . . • for use as a bill of exceptions? I
need hardly pause to suggest that such a claim would present no substantial federal
question. The Court, however, either takes judicial notice that as a practical matter
the alternative methods of preparing a bill of exceptions are inadequate or finds in
petitioners' claim an allegation of fact that their circumstances were such as to prevent
them from utilizing the alternative methods." Id. at 32.
120 Qua, Griffin v. Illinois, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 143, 150 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
1so Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948) (test for right to assigned counsel
in non-capital cases). Cf. Bush v. Texas, 353 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.), cert.
granted, 371 U.S. 859 (1962) (indigent not entitled to a competent independent psychiatrist or otherwise to have psychiatric evidence as to his present sanity made available).
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but even when he knows the witness's precise whereabouts, he has
no absolute right to summon him at government expense. This
is left to the wide discretion of the trial court.131 Indeed, even in
federal prosecutions, the marshal may demand funds from defendant in advance in order to defray the expenses of the witness
and, consistently with the right to compulsory process under the
sixth amendment (let alone fifth amendment due process), refuse
to make the service without the advance payment.132
A. Are you telling me that an indigent defendant can be forced
to stand trial without key defense witnesses, because he's financially unable to pay the requisite costs and fees?

Q. Key witnesses, no. Not because anything in the federal
constitution assures a poor man the same effective presentation
of his defense he could make if he were a rich man. Only because
at some point poverty works such a hardship, so impairs the guiltdetermining process, that the government must step in to assure
fundamental, essential fairness. This is your "key witness" case.
This is Betts v. Brady all over again.
If the holding in Griffin were as broad as you claim it is, the
poor man would have the constitutional right to summon at government expense any witness who might be at all helpful, not
just those whose testimony might be crucial. The point you won't
meet is that he clearly does not have this absolute right. Even in
federal prosecutions, the poor man's right to secure defense witnesses is qualified, in effect, whereas the rich man's is not.
Thus, although the costs of process and the fees of witnesses
subpoenaed for an indigent federal defendant may be paid by the
government, the indigent must support his motion for the issuance of a subpoena by affidavit in which, inter alia, he "shall show
that the evidence of the witness is material to the defense [and]
that the defendant cannot safely go to trial without the witness." 133
131 See, e.g., Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70, 73 (1895); Wallace v. Hunter,
149 F.2d 59, 61 (10th Cir. 1945); Neufield v. United States, ll8 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 798 (1942); Gibson v. United States, 53 F.2d 721 (8th Cir.
1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 557 (1932). Cf. Rains v. State, 173 Neb. 586, ll4 N.W.2d
399, petition for cert. filed, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3130 (U.S. Oct. 16, 1962) (No. 502). The
state court held that absent a showing as to what material evidence would be adduced,
it was no denial of due process or equal protection to deny the financially able defendant's motion to take deposition of a state prisoner whose testimony was asserted to
be material to defense, although the prosecution was permitted to produce another state
prisoner to testify against the defendant at trial.
132 Brewer v. Hunter, 63 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1947); Duy v. Knowlton, 14 Fed. 107
(C.C.D. Ind. 1882).
133 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(b).
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The trial court may limit the number of defense witnesses to be
subpoenaed at government expense134 or deny the motion altogether.135 Indeed, until fairly recently, no procedure existed
whereby an indigent could procure at government expense the
attendance of witnesses found in another district and more than
100 miles away from the place of trial.136
The witness cases demonstrate, once again, that so long as
certain minimum standards are met, the quality of a man's defense
does depend on the amount of money he has. They demonstrate
that the state need not equalize economic conditions so that a poor
man may enjoy certain rights as fully as a rich man.
A. So Griffin adds nothing to the right to counsel problem.

Q. That's right. A state cannot "shut off means of appellate
review for indigent defendants"; 137 a state "cannot by force of its
exactions draw a line which precludes convicted indigent persons,
forsooth erroneously convicted, from securing such a review
merely by disabling them from bringing to the notice of an appellate tribunal errors of the trial court which would upset the
conviction were practical opportunity for review not foreclosed." 138
That's Griffin. That's all. How does this aid your cause? That's
also Cochran v. Kansas, 139 decided three weeks before Betts v.
Brady!
In Cochran, as in the later case of Dowd v. Cook,140 the Court
held that prison rules which deny prisoners access to appellate
courts deprive them of the equal protection of the laws. Note
well:
"[T]he prison rules in Cochran and Dowd forbade only the
prisoner from maintaining his appeal. Presumably, the prisoners in these cases, if they had been able to afford it, could
have pursued their appeals through attorneys. That they did
not do so probably indicates their financial inability to do so.
Thus, in the earlier cases as well as in Griffin, poverty was a
significant element in the finding that equal protection had
been withheld." 141
134 See, e.g.,
135 See cases

O'Hara v. United States, 129 Fed. 551 (6th Cir. 1904).
cited in note 131 supra.
136 See 4 BARRON, FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 2042 &: n.7 (1951).
137 Frankfurter, J., concurring in Griffin, 351 U.S. at 23.
138 Ibid.
139 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
140 340 U.S. 206 (1951).
141 Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 151, 156
(1957).
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That a unanimous Court (per Justice Black, author of the
Betts dissent) handed down Cochran the same Term a majority
declined to extend the "absolute" right to counsel to indigent
state defendants well demonstrates that the need to afford indigent
defendants access to trial or appellate courts falls far short of a
requirement that they be furnished with counsel, expert witnesses
or other aids once they gain access to the courts. Griffin is' also
an access case. It does not overrule or undermine the Betts rule
any more than did Cochran forestall its promulgation in the first
place.
Nor does the post-Griffin case of Smith v. Bennett142 affect the
Betts rule. Smith, you will recall, holds that to make the availability of state habeas corpus contingent on the payment of a filing
fee results in denying an indigent prisoner the equal protection
of the laws. Does it follow that an indigent prisoner who tests
the state's right to detain him is then entitled to the services of
a lawyer to effectuate his habeas corpus rights in the state's courts?
Hardly. Why, "to date the decisions have not imposed upon the
federal district courts an absolute duty to appoint counsel whenever an indigent files papers collaterally attacking a federal conviction.... None of the [federal] circuits appears to regard the
appointment of counsel as mandatory in such cases." 143
To sum up, "the presence of counsel [in Betts] is not a sine
qua non to access to the courts, as was the availability of the transcript in the Griffin case,"144 or, one might add, the availability
of counsel in Cochran, or the payment of a filing fee in Smith v.
Bennett. Betts and Griffin are easily reconcilable. "[T]he state,
having provided a road, need not guarantee that every man have
equally as good a car to drive down it." 14 1>
A. This glib approach has aptly been branded a "sophisticated
legal fiction":
" 'Law addresses itself to actualities,' said Justice Frankfurter
in the Griffin case [351 U.S. at 23], and this theme runs
through Black's and Frankfurter's opinions. Can it be supposed that these devoted and clear-sighted justices, and those
365 U.S. 708 (1961).
Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783,
799-800 (1961). (Emphasis added.)
144 Comment, 55 MICH. L. REv. 413, 420 (1957).
145 Comment, 1959 DUKE L.J. 484, 486. It should be pointed out, however, tbat
otbers are fonder of tbis metaphor tban its creator, for he goes on to suggest tbat
tbis distinction is only "superficially' palatable. Ibid.
142
143
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who concurred with them, will not say there is a difference in
kind between giving a convict no hearing at all and giving
him a hearing under a killing handicap? Will not the failure
to provide an adequate hearing, like the failure to provide
an adequate appeal, run afoul of both the equal protection
and due process clauses?"146

Q. "Killing handicap"? "Failure to provide an adequate
hearing"? I've heard some question-begging in my time, but I
must say this wins the prize. If Betts is soundly premised, if lack
of counsel is sometimes but not always a "killing handicap," then
there is a real difference between no hearing at all and one without
counsel. If so, I take it Griffin does not apply. On the other hand,
if Betts was misconceived, if lack of counsel is necessarily a "killing
handicap," if ipso facto it renders a hearing "inadequate" or "unfair," then we don't need the equal protection clause. Due process
will do just fine. Either way you come out, Griffin doesn't add a
thing.

III.

HEREIN OF THE lNDIGENT's A.BsoLUTE RIGHT
TO AssIGNED COUNSEL-IN CAPITAL CASES

A. All right, let's get back to fourteenth amendment due process. You have been telling me that the state need not "equalize"
the plight of the indigent accused by furnishing him the aids a
rich man would enjoy. The state, your argument runs, has an
affirmative duty to assure essential, fundamental justice-no more.
This falls far short of assuring the indigent the best of all possible
defenses. To put it another way, the state need only supply the
indigent defendant with "necessities," not "luxuries."
Fine. Let's take it from there. What about the indigent's right
to assigned counsel in capital cases? Here there is a "flat" requirement of counsel. Here the concept of due process is not "less rigid
and more fluid" than the sixth amendment. 147 Why not?
On the basis of what you yourself have said there can be but
one answer: here, at least, the Court has recognized that "want of
counsel" necessarily deprives an indigent defendant of minimal
fairness. Now, I cannot see-and I challenge you to find-any
rational basis for distinguishing capital cases from non-

Q. Hold on! This was true before the Betts case. This is
146
147

Willcox &: Bloustein, supra note 114, at 24,
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942).
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Powell v. Alabama.148 If Powell failed to head off Betts in the first
place, whyA. You hold on. This is not the Powell case. "All that it is
necessary now to decide, as we do decide," the Court said then,
"is that in a capital case, where the defendant is ... incapable
adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble
mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court
... to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law." 149 Thus, Powell, too, may be said to reflect a "fluid"
approach. The Betts rule was wrong from the start, but initially
it was at least internally consistent.
Indeed, although there is earlier dicta about the indigent capital defendant's unqualified right to counsel,1 50 the first holding
to this effect seems to be the very recent capital case of Hamilton
v. Alabama.151 There, a unanimous Court observed that "when
one pleads to a capital case without benefit of counsel, we do not
stop to determine whether prejudice resulted" for "the degree of
prejudice can never be known." 152
Now, what is there about a maximum sentence of twenty years
or life imprisonment that enables us to ascertain the degree of
prejudice in those cases? That puts "want of counsel" above the
plimsoll line of due process? As Justice Douglas, author of the
unanimous Hamilton opinion, has himself observed elsewhere:
"[T]o draw the line between this case [taking indecent liberties
with a child, punishable by 20 years imprisonment] and cases
where the maximum penalty is death is to make a distinction
which makes no sense in terms of the absence or presence of need
for counsel. Yet it is the need ... that establishes the real standard
for determining whether the lack of counsel rendered the trial
unfair." 153
One can push further. One can argue that a prosecution for
murder (the most prevalent capital offense) generally produces
less need for counsel than do prosecutions for a number of noncapital felonies. The average man charged with murder usually
knows whether or not he struck the blow or fired the shot that
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
Id. at 71. (Emphasis added.)
11:iO See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674, 676 (1948); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335;
U.S. 437, 440-41 (1948).
Hil 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
1112 Id. at 55.
lti3 Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. &.10, 682 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
148
149
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killed the deceased. He usually has some notion that the fact he
killed "accidentally" or in self-defense means that he is unjustly
accused. "Indictments charging the accused with such crimes as
embezzlement, confidence game, or conspiracy are likely to place
the unrepresented defendant in a far more helpless position." 1ll4
I need not go this far, however. I need only point out that a
capital case does not produce a greater need for skilled representation in the guilt-determining process than do non-capital cases.
This much is easy. What is a "capital offense"? The answer varies
from state to state. No crime-not even murder-is everywhere
punishable by death.155 Most serious felonies, i.e., kidnapping,
rape, robbery, burglary, arson, train-wrecking, a variety of assault,
are somewhere punishable by death. 156
How can any rational man argue that an unrepresented defendant charged with rape, robbery or arson in State X is necessarily in a more helpless position than a fellow-indigent charged
with the same crime in State Y? How can a rational man deny
that either the "flat" requirement of assigned counsel in capital
cases or the "special circumstances" test in non-capital cases is
patently wrong? Now that the absolute right to assigned counsel
in capital cases is settled law, how can any rational man fail to
"feel too much the force of consistency not to take this added
step" 157 of extending the right to other felony cases?

Q. You know, now that I think about it, I'm delighted that
you brought up the capital cases. For you have given me an insight
154 Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAULL. REv.
211, 230 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
lu5 Sellin, The Death Penalty 1-3, in MODEL PENAL CODE 220 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). Cf. Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 244 (1960) (Congress cannot authorize
military trials for overseas civilian dependents-even in noncapital cases): "Another
serious obstacle to permitting military prosecution of noncapital offenses, while rejecting
capital ones, is that it would place in the hands of the military an unrcvicwable discretion to exercise jurisdiction over civilian dependents simply by downgrading the
offense, thus stripping the accused of his constitutional rights and protections."
156 Sellin, supra note 155, at 4.
157 L. Hand, J., concurring in In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 465 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
331 U.S. 804, writ dismissed on motion of petitioner, 332 U.S. 807 (1947) (pre-trial
suppression of involuntary confession). Cf. Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234, 242
(1960) (discussed in note 155 supra): "The Government . . • says that the trial of •••
a person for a noncapital crime is 'significantly different' from his trial for a capital
one • . • and that, therefore, there must be a fresh evaluation of the necessities for
court-martial jurisdiction and a new balancing of the rights involved. • • • [T]hese
necessities add up to about the same as those asserted in capital cases and which the
concurrence in second Covert held as not of sufficient 'promixity, physical and social
• • • to the "land and naval forces" • • • as reasonably to demonstrate a justification'
for court-martial prosecution."
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I should have had a long time ago. If the only value-goal present
in the due process right to counsel cases were the reliability of the
guilt-affixing process, then it would indeed be difficult to square
the Betts rule with the unqualified right to assigned counsel in
capital cases or, for that matter, the absolute right to counsel if
you can afford it. But the "rigid" approach manifested in Hamilton and Chandler and Ferguson does not evidence the unsoundness
of the Betts rule; it only demonstrates the unsoundness of your
starting premise. An absolute right to assigned counsel is warranted in the capital cases not because the danger of unjust conviction looms any larger but because the awesome finality of the
death sentence makes want of counsel more "offensive to a decent
respect for the dignity of man. " 158
The unqualified right to counsel when one can afford it also
suggests the presence of that second due process value-goal: "the
preservation of the intrinsic dignity and worth of the individual."159 Again-although the need for counsel may be the sameit is more offensive to "the community's sense of fair play and
decency" 160 for the state actively to block or frustrate the efforts
of a defendant financially able to fully enjoy "his day in court"
than for the state simply to decline to wipe out a defendant's economic disadvantage so that he may fully avail himself of "his day
in court."
In short, to use your terminology, Hamilton, Chandler and
Ferguson do not constitute "pure" examples of threats to the integrity of the guilt-determining process. Rather, like the perjured
testimony, coerced confession and most procedural due process
cases, they, too, are "hybrids."161
A. Why, then, is the presence or absence of the death penalty
without significance in perjured testimony and coerced confession
cases? Why, then, don't we limit the "automatic rule of reversal"
in coerced confession cases to prosecutions for a capital offense and
demand a showing of prejudice in other felony cases? Why, then,
don't we require a greater impairment of the guilt-determining
process when perjured testimony is introduced in non-capital cases
than in capital ones?
1158 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
150 Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 357 (1957).
1-00 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
101 See text following note 88 supra.
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Take Rochin, the "pure" example of disrespect for man's dignity" or "individuality."162 Are you suggesting that forcible stomach-pumping would have to be more "shocking" or less "repulsive," depending on whether the victim of such brutality faced a
maximum sentence of ten or twenty years or a possible death sentence?

Q. You yourself supplied the answer to this one a while back.
All these cases involve police-prosecutor misconduct. This warrants the "disciplinary" or "deterrent" automatic rule of reversal.
Since the failure to provide an indigent defendant with counsel
does not constitute state misconduct, that rule isn't applicable.
A. I cannot believe that whether or not a confession coerced
by or perjured testimony induced by private citizens vitiates a
conviction turns on the length of the sentence the defendant might
receive.

Q. Look at it another way. A distinction between capital and
non-capital cases in the coerced confession, perjured testimony or
search and seizure cases finds no support in history. The same cannot be said for the right to assigned counsel. Before the Revolution, most of the few colonies which recognized such a right did
so only in capital cases.163 Seven months before the ratification of
the sixth amendment Congress provided for the assignment of
counsel in cases of "treason or other capital crime." 164 Need I
remind you that "the life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience"?165
A. If you're so strong on history, why stop with colonial experience? Why not go back a bit farther-when the less serious
the offense the greater the right to counsel?166 Indeed, with the exception of treason cases-perhaps because "members of Parliament were themselves prospective defendants" in such cases and
had a "lively appreciation of what procedure would be appropriate"167-until 1836 an English defendant was not permitted to
retain counsel in the fullest sense in felony cases (most of which
102 342 U.S. at 173.
163 See BEANEY 18.
liH

Id. at 28.

165 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
1'66 See BEANEY 8.
167 Schaefer, supra note 118, at 2.

1962]

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

259

were punishable by death). 168 Need I remind you that Holmes
also said: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if ... the rule simply persists from blind imitation
of the past." 169
Now, let's test your suggestion that the Betts rule can be
squared with the unqualified right to counsel in other situations
so long as one takes into account the "dignity" or "individuality"
due process value. Reconsider Ferguson v. Georgia. 110 Defense
counsel cross-examined all seventeen witnesses for the State; indeed he subjected five to re-cross-examination. 171 In addition, he
objected to the admission of a written confession and real evidence.172 Moreover, as the State of Georgia pointed out, "there
was nothing to prevent counsel from questioning his client prior
to trial, and advising him as to what points to emphasize in such
a statement." 173 Under these circumstances, how can you possibly
regard the inability of defense counsel to ask his client questions
or make suggestions when he gave his statement more "offensive"
than the plight of Betts? After all, Betts had to cope with difficult
problems of jail identification, hearsay and self-incrimination,
none of which he came close to understanding. 174 After all, Betts
had no legal assistance at any stage, at any time. He had to go it
alone all the way.
What you are really saying, what you must be saying, is this:
No matter how educated and intelligent the accused,175 no matter
168

See

BEANEY

8-9; l

STEPHEN,

A

HlsTORY OF

nm

CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND

341

(188!1).

The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 187 (1920).
570 (1961).
171 Record, pp. ii-iii.
172 Id. at 7, 9-11.
173 Brief for Georgia, p. 13.
174 The phrase "jail identification" refers generally to the problems of providing
requisite safeguards incident to the identification by outsiders of an already incarcerated
accused. For an extensive discussion of the Betts record, see Kamisar, The Right to
Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right"
of an Accused, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. l (1962).
175 CJ. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). The Court ruled that defendantan experienced lawyer and former assistant United States attorney-was deprived of the
sixth amendment "assistance of counsel" when the trial judge, though advised of the
possibility that conflicting interests might arise, appointed defendant's counsel to represent a co-defendant as well. "The fact that Glasser is an attorney is, of course, immaterial to a consideration of his right to the protection of the Sixth Amendment.
His professional experience may be a factor in determining whether he actually waived
his right •••• But it is by no means conclusive." Id. at 70. Presumably the same
approach would govern where a legally trained indigent state defendant was prosecuted
for a capital offense or, regardless of the charge, was fortunate enough to have his
own lawyer.
100 HOLMES,
110 365 U.S.
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how simple the case, no matter how much assistance defense counsel has rendered generally, to permit an indigent capital defendant to remain unrepresented-even for a brief period-to deny
the aid of counsel to any defendant fortunate enough to have a
lawyer-even for a brief interval in a misdemeanor case-is more
of an affront to the dignity and worth of man than compelling a
Betts to defend himself against a major felony charge as best he
can without any counsel at any stage, at any time. Are you sure
you want to debate this point?

IV.

WHERE

To

DRAW THE LINE?

Q. I wouldn't mind so much if all you were asking was that
we extend the unqualified right to assigned counsel from capital
offenses to "serious" or "major" felonies but"To deduce from the due process clause a rule binding
upon the States in this matter would be to impose upon
them, as Judge Bond points out, a requirement without distinction between criminal charges of different magnitude or
in respect of courts of varying jurisdiction. As he says:
'Charges of small crimes tried before justices of the peace
and capital charges tried in the higher courts would equally
require the appointment of counsel. Presumably it would be
argued that trials in the Traffic Court would require it.' And
indeed it was said by petitioner's counsel both below and in
this court, that as the Fourteenth Amendment extends the
protection of due process to property as well as to life and
liberty, if we hold with the petitioner, logic would require
the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving property.'' 176
A. It seems a sufficient reply to say that this type of reasoning
could be used to condemn any principle whatever, because there
is no principle which does not become troublesome if it is extended far enough. "[W]here to draw the line . . . is the question
in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law," 177 but the
"wedge" objection "would make it impossible to draw a line,
because the line would have to be pushed farther and farther
back until all action became vetoed." 178
If it is fitting and proper to treat as guilty of murder "a gaoler
who voluntarily causes the death of a prisoner by omitting to sup176 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
177 Holmes,
in Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168 (1925).
178 WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

J.,

315 (1957).
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ply that prisoner with food, or a nurse who voluntarily causes the
death of an infant entrusted to her care by omitting to take it out
of a tub of water into which it has fallen," 179 it is no less appropriate to do so, even though, by persistence in the principle when
some of the circumstances are changed, a man would be punished
as a murderer who "does not go fifty yards through the sun of
Bengal at noon ... in order to caution a traveller against a swollen
river" 180 or a surgeon would be so treated "for refusing to go from
Calcutta to Meerut to perform an operation." 181
We need look no farther than Griffin-where precisely the argument you now advance was unsuccessfully made182-to find support for the view that if justice requires and practicalities permit
the taking of a first step, then the first step is fair and feasiblewherever a second or third step may lead us.

Q. Where do you propose to draw the line?
A. One good place would be where much of the law already
draws it, i.e., the felony-misdemeanor distinction.183
179 Lord Macaulay, Note M, at 53, in INDIAN LA.w COMMISSIONERS' P.ENAL CoDE (1837).
1so Id. at 56.
181 Id. at 53.
182 See, e.g., Brief for Illinois, p. 9, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956): "Petitioners'
logic would compel compulsory stenography before every justice of the peace, police
court or magistrate if the State's appellate practice permits review of convictions based
upon such transcripts."
At this point I cannot resist relating the account in PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER
REMINISCES 102 (1960), of Professor Frankfurter's oral argument in Bunting v. Oregon,
243 U.S. 426 (1917) (sustaining state legislation limiting work in manufacturing establishments to no more than ten hours a day):
"During the course of the argument McReynolds said to me, 'Ten hours! Ten hours!
Ten! Why not four?' ••• Then I moved down towards him and said, 'Your honor,
if by chance I may make such a hypothesis, if your physician should find that you're
eating too much meat, it isn't necessary for him to urge you to become a vegetarian.'
"Holmes said, 'Good for you!' very embarrassingly right from the bench. He loathed
these arguments that if you go this far you must go further."
183 See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CODE § 1.05, comment at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954):
"This section reflects the important decision to retain the felony-misdemeanor classification which is so pervasive in existing law. While the retention of these categories has
some disadvantages, in that the felony concept tends to be used for many, varied, unrelated purposes, their abandonment involves so large a dislocation of procedure that
the gain would not offset the loss."
Some thirty years ago the American Law Institute proposed that "before the
defendant is arraigned on a charge of felony if he is without counsel the court shall,
unless the defendant objects, assign him counsel to represent him in the cause." AU
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROC. § 203 (1931 Official Draft). The statutes or court rules of thirtyseven states now provide for the assignment of counsel-regardless of "special circumstances"-in at least all cases where an indigent is charged with a felony, usually at
or before arraignment. For a summary of the provisions of the forty-eight states as of
1958, sec the appendix following p. 95 in SPECIAL CoMll!I1TEE To STUDY DEFENDER
SYSTEMS, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED (1959).
In an appendix to his concurring opinion in McNeal v. Culver, 365 U.S. 109, 119-22
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For example, "the common law approach to a solution of the
problem [the use of deadly force to effect an arrest]-which underlies much, though not all of the existing law-is based on the distinction between felony and misdemeanor; deadly force is authorized where necessary to prevent the escape of one fleeing from
arrest for felony, but not for misdemeanor." 184 Moreover, many
states permit a private citizen to kill in the course of resisting an
attempt to commit a felony involving bodily security against him
or his spouse, child or other loved one.185 And in most jurisdictions even accidental homicide constitutes some degree of murder if it occurs in the course of the commission of a felony. 186 There
seems to be something about a "felony," doesn't there?
Probably more important, for our purposes, is the "aftermath"
of the felony conviction, "including the bitter incidentals that flow
from it," for this "far exceeds" the prison sentence per se "as a
measurement of society's determination to chastise and humiliate":181
"The convicted felon who has been sentenced to a term
in prison may find himself deprived of one or more of the
following civil rights, depending on his residence: (1) the
right to vote in all states, except seven; (2) the right to hold
(1961), Mr. Justice Douglas lists thirty-five states which "provide for appointment of
counsel as of course on behalf of an indigent in any felony case." Id. at 119. Since this
appendix was compiled, Colorado has made appointment of counsel mandatory in all
felony cases, CoLO. R. CRIM. P. 44, effective Nov. 1, 1961. Furthermore, in excluding
Michigan from this group Mr. Justice Douglas overlooked (as did the SPECIAL COM•
MITIEE To STUDY DEFENDER SYsrEMS, supra) Mica. CT. R. 35A, adopted June 4, 1947,
effective Sept. 1, 1947, which provides that "if the accused is not represented by counsel
upon arraignment, before he is required to plead the court shall advise the accused
that he is entitled •.• to have counsel, and that in case he is financially unable .••
the court will, if accused so requests, appoint counsel for him." This rule is set forth
in 318 Mich. xxxix (1947), and is quoted in full in People v. Bumpus, 355 Mich. 374,
376-77, 94 N.W.2d 854, 855 (1959). Rule 785.3 of the new Michigan General Court Rules,
effective January 1, 1963, contains an identical provision.
I am indebted to Samuel J. Torina, Solicitor General of Michigan when McNeal
v. Culver was handed down, now Chief Appellate Lawyer, Office of the Prosecuting
Attorney, Wayne County, and instructor in criminal law at the University of Detroit,
for bringing Rule 35A to my attention. I am also indebted to Edward J. McCormack, Jr.,
and Gerald A. Berlin, Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts,
respectively, attorneys for amicus curiae in Gideon v. Cochran [cert. granted, 370 U.S.
908 (1962)], for informing me that Michigan is in a sense "setting the record straight"
by joining twenty-one other states in urging the overruling of Betts v. Brady.

184 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, comment at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
185 For a summary of statutory provisions, see id. at app. A, 82-84.
186 For a summary of the prevailing law of felony-murder, both statutory

and decisional, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment at 33-37 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
187 Teeters, The Loss of Civil Rights of the Convicted Felon and Their Reinstate•
ment, 25 PRISON J. 77 (1945).
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office, in most states; (3) the right to make a contract; (4) the
right to testify as a witness or at least to have testimony expunged; (5) to serve on a jury." 188
"In thirty-six states, conviction of a felony, coupled with
imprisonment, is a ground for divorce, and if a divorce is
granted pardon does not restore conjugal rights. In some
jurisdictions, the felon's children can be given to adoption
without his consent. . . .
"State statutes commonly list some of the following who
may be deprived of their occupations as a result of their conviction of an infamous crime: accountants, barbers, civil engineers, detectives, automobile operators, embalmers, hairdressers, junk dealers, real estate brokers, liquor store owners,
pawnbrokers, pharmacists, midwives, naturopaths, nurses, veterinarians, chiropodists, chiropractors, dentists, physicians,
surgeons, and lawyers." 189
"Every fact-pattern of common life, so far as the legal order
can take it in, carries within itself its appropriate, natural rules,
its right law. This ... rests on the solid foundation of what reason
can recognize in the nature of man and of the life conditions of
the time and place .... " 190 The fact-pattern, I assert, is the felony
case; the wrong law, I submit, is Betts v. Brady. The "problemsituation extends as far as you are perfectly clear, in your own mind,
that you have grasped the picture fully and completely in lifeessence and in its detailed variants, and therefore know it to present
a significantly single whole, and one over which your knowledge and
judgment have command." 191 I am uncertain whether the problem-situation is wider in scope, i.e., whether it embraces misdemeanants as well, but I am perfectly clear that it is no narrower than the felony situation. This much I do know: No man
should be branded a "felon" or "ex-felon"-no man should be
so reduced to being a "handicapped 'twilight' citizen"192-without
the assistance of counsel for his defense.

Q. Surely, you must realize that "felony" is even less of a unitary concept than "capital offense." "The fact that many things
188 Id. at 80. See also BARNES & TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 544-46
(3d ed. 1959).
189 Tappan, The Legal Rights of Prisoners, Annals, May 1954, pp. 99, 101-02.
190 Levin Goldschmidt, quoted in LLEWELLYN, THE COJ\ll\lON LAw TRADmoN: DECIDING
APPEALS 122 (1960).
101 LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 190, at 427.
192 Teeters, supra note 187, at 86.
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which are classed as felonies in one state are classed as misdemeanors in nearby states shows how difficult it is to make a real distinction between them. Even within a single state the distinction often
is vague." 193 The irrelevant factors which influence the felonymisdemeanor distinction are well illustrated by Massachusetts'
experience:
"Since 1852, when a felony was first defined in Massachusetts
as a crime punishable by confinement in the state prison, at
least four changes have been made in the laws of that state, determining the conditions under which a sentence is served in
state prison rather than in a jail or house of correction. These
changes, which also changed crimes from felonies to misdemeanors or the reverse, were not made because of alterations
in views regarding the atrocity of crimes but for purely administrative reasons, generally to relieve the congestion of the
state prison." 194
Is the constitutional right to assigned counsel to turn on such
considerations?
You pointed out that justifiable homicide in effecting an arrest
generally turns on the felony-misdemeanor distinction. But you
neglected to add that the reporters for the Model Penal Code
found this distinction "manifestly inadequate for modern law." 195
One good reason: "[U]nder modern legislation, many statutory
misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous to life and limb
than some felonies. Compare, for example, such felonies as the
distillation of alcohol in violation of the revenue laws, on the one
hand, and such misdemeanors as reckless and drunken driving,
on the other." 106
I need not stop at reckless driving. I can do much better than
that. I can talk about "reckless" or "negligent" homicide. Criminal homicide by automobile technically comes within the definition of involuntary manslaughter, but because juries hesitate to
convict of manslaughter under these circumstances, many states
have enacted special provisions concerning this type of homicide,
prescribing a misdemeanor penalty of up to six months or one year
imprisonment.197 Some have gone farther. They have simply called
193 SUTHERLAND &: CRESSEY, PRINCil'LES OF CRIMINOLOGY 16 (6th ed. 1960).
194 Id. at 17.
190 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07, comment at 56 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
196 Id. at 56-57.
197 See generally MORELAND, THE LAw OF HOMICIDE 246-52 (1952); Riesenfeld,

Negligent Homicide-A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1936); Robinson, Manslaughter by Motorists, 22 MINN. L. REv. 755 (1938).
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the offense a "misdemeanor," while retaining a felony penalty. In
1947, for example, Michigan designated "negligent homicide," until then a felony, a "misdemeanor," and although the maximum
penalty of five years and/or 1,000 dollar fine was lowered, it remains a hefty two years and/or 2,000 dollar fine. 198
Correct me if I'm wrong, but as I see it, a legislature can wipe
out the gains your proposal entails simply by changing the classification of an offense from "felony'' to "misdemeanor," the substance and reality remaining the same.199
A. No, of course not. I agree that the felony-misdemeanor distinction, as it now exists among the states, does not furnish a perfect peg on which to hang the limitations of a constitutional right,
but it does provide a rough, and ready, peg. Utilizing the basic
dichotomy does not preclude critical attention to certain misclassifications.
The state's characterization of its criminal offenses for varied,
unrelated state purposes does not bind the Supreme Court when
the content of a federal right is at issue. The scope of such a right
750.324 (1948).
New Jersey designates most crimes as "misdemeanors" or "high misdemeanors." For
example, kidnapping, punishable by life imprisonment, N.J. REv. STAT. § 2:143-1 (1937);
forcible rape, punishable by 30 years' imprisonment, N.J. REv. STAT. § 2:163-1 (1937); and
robbery, punishable by 15 years' imprisonment, N.J. REv. STAT. § 2:166-1 (1937); are all
classified as "high misdemeanors." Fortunately, N.J. RULES 1:12-9 provides counsel as of
right to all indigents "charged with a crime." Although other jurisdictions do not depart
as widely from the typical grading of offenses as does New Jersey, probably most depart
in some respects. Thus, in June of this year, Delaware Deputy Attorney General E.
Norman Veasey, a member of a recently appointed Committee of the Superior Court
of Delaware presently studying existing and proposed rules for appointment of counsel,
reported to the Committee that "my examination of the Delaware Code ••. indicates
that there will be in excess of thirty-five statutory misdemeanors" punishable by more
than one year's imprisonment. Report 4, on file in the University of Minnesota Law
Library. He cited narcotic violations, classified as "misdemeanors," but punishable by
ten years' imprisonment, as "the most striking example." Ibid. This has led Mr. Veasey
to recommend that "counsel should be required to be appointed by the Court in all
felonies and in serious misdemeanors," i.e., "in all cases where the offense is punishable
by more than one year imprisonment." Ibid. "The Committee has not yet completed
its project and this report represents only my thoughts as an individual." Letter from
Mr. Veasey to Yale Kamisar, Aug. 20, 1962, on file in the University of Minnesota Law
Library.
100 Cf. Crane, J., dissenting in People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 179-80, 183 N.E. 353,
356, 260 N.Y. Supp. app. 353, 356 (1932): "[D)o these protections and safeguards, found
necessary against arbitrary and abusive power, apply only to grown-ups, or do our
children share the protection? ••. Can a child be deprived of his liberty, taken from
his home and incarcerated in an institution for a term of years, by changing the name
of the offense from 'burglary' or 'larceny' to 'juvenile delinquency'? • . • May the
Legislature call forgery, larceny, burglary, assault, 'moral delinquency,' and send a
person twenty years of age to • . • some • • . correctional institution, on his own
confession, wrung from him by an inquisitorial process in court, compelling him to
be a witness against himself?"
108 MICH. COMP. LAws §
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is, of course, a federal question to be determined finally by the
federal courts. When I urge that the right to assigned counsel be
extended to all "felony" prosecutions I assume, of course, that
"federal characterization" will tidy up the category and prevent
the anomalous results you suggest.200
What I had in mind was something along these lines: The
right to assigned counsel should extend to all indigents charged
with (1) any offense designated a "felony" by the particular state
(because of the opprobrium which attaches to and the "bitter
incidentals" which flow from this categorization), and-regardless
of state characterization- (2) any other offense punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year (the definition of
felony now generally employed in most jurisdictions)201 or, if I
can push my luck, for a term exceeding six months (the federal
misdemeanor-petty offense distinction); 202 or [substitute (2)] any
"infamous crime"; 203 or [alternative substitute (2)] any offense involving "moral turpitude." 204
200 Cf. Gonzales v. Barber, 207 F.2d 398, 400 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 637
(1954): "[Petitioner] argues that the crime is not, per se, one which involves moral
turpitude. A California case is cited . . • • However, there the California court was
concerned with whether the crime involved such moral turpitude as to reflect upon
the attorney's moral fitness to practice law, a state question. Here we are faced with
the federal question of whether the crime involves such moral turpitude as to show
that the alien has a criminal heart and a criminal tendency •..• In the federal law,
assault with a deadly weapon is such a crime."
See also United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955) (state's characterization of
its lien not controlling on question of relative priority of United States' lien); Dyke v.
Dyke, 227 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 850 (1956) (state law on
mental capacity disregarded in an action to determine rights to proceeds of national
service life insurance policy); Fulda &: Klemme, The Statute of Limitations in Antitrust
Litigation, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 233, 241-44 (1955) ("federal characterization" of state statutes
of limitations when no federal statute of limitations was applicable to treble damage
suits under the federal antitrust laws). See generally Mishkin, The Variousness of
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules
for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957).
201 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05, comment at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
202 18 U.S.C. § I (1958).
203 An "infamous crime,'' within the meaning of the fifth amendment, providing
that "no person shall be held to answer for a[n] . . . infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,'' includes any offense (except criminal
contempt), whether designated a "felony" or "misdemeanor," punishable by imprisonment for over a year or at hard labor for any term, irrespective of whether the place
of confinement be a prison or a workhouse. See, e.g., United States v. Moreland, 258
U.S. 433, 437 (1922); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896); Ex parte
Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426-29 (1885). The misdemeanor of willfully neglecting to support
one's minor children, subject to a punishment of twelve months hard labor in the
workhouse and/or a S500 fine has been held to be an "infamous crime." United States
v. Moreland, supra. On the other hand, the Court has ruled that the misdemeanor of
attempting to influence a juror by a written <:°mmunication, punishable by i~priso1:3ment
for not more than six months and/or a maximum fine of $1,000 could be tried without
an indictment. Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492 (1937). Criminal contempts "possess
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Q. Quite a mouthful.
A. Yes it is. For the reason that I am not at all sure that a
straight penalty cut-off point will necessarily do the trick. Sure,
this is an important safeguard against "felonies" in "misdemeanor"
clothing, but the moral quality of the offense, regardless of the
penalty it carries, is also a significant factor. For example, considering the depravity of the offense, there is much to be said for
furnishing counsel to an indigent charged with "reckless" homicide, even though it is neither designated a felony nor punishable by a sentence in excess of one year or, for that matter, six
months. 205
Now that I think about it, perhaps it would be easier to approach the problem from another direction. It may be more
helpful to ask: what offenders need not be afforded counsel and
our policy still endure it?206 One answer is those prosecuted for
misdemeanors, but a better one may well be those charged with
"petty offenses" or "summary offenses," i.e., those numerous,
relatively trivial offenses tried summarily without a jury and
punished by commitment to jail or a workhouse.207 A flat maxia unique character under the Constitution"; though subject to sentences of imprisonment exceeding one year, they are not "infamous crimes" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 187 (1958).
204 The immigration and nationality laws exclude from admission into the United
States "aliens who have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude • . • or
••• who admit having committed such a crime" [8 U.S.C. § 1182(9) (Supp. III, 1962)],
and render deportable any alien "convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry" and sentenced for a year or more, or any alien
"who at any time after entry is convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude
••• regardless of whether confined therefor." 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1958).
"The term 'moral turpitude' has deep roots in the law. The presence of moral
turpitude has been used as a test in a variety of situations, including legislation governing the disbarment of attorney and the revocation of medical licenses [and] . . •
as a criterion in disqualifying and impeaching witnesses." Jordan v. De George, 341
U.S. 223, 227 (1951). "[I]t is not decisive that the crime is described as a felony, since
moral turpitude does not inhere in all felonies. Conversely, some misdemeanors may
be held to involve moral turpitude." GORDON & RosENFIELD, IMMIGRATION I.Aw AND
PROCEDURE 468 (1959). For a comprehensive classification of specific crimes, see id. at
472-81.
205 Cf. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930), where the Court held that
the offense of "reckless driving," although subject only to a maximum punishment of
30 days' imprisonment or $100 fine, could not be categorized a "petty offense," in respect of which Congiess may dispense with a jury trial. "The offense here charged
is not merely malum prohibitum, but in its very nature is malum in se • . • • [It]
is an act of such obvious depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would
be to shock the general moral sense. If the act • • • had culminated in the death
of a human being, respondent would have been subject to indictment for some degiee
of felonious homicide." Id. at 73.
200 Cf. Cardozo, J., in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
207 See generally IiELLER, THE SIX'lli AMENDMENT TO TIIE CONSTITUTION OF THE
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mum punishment approach, whatever the cut-off point, does not
furnish sufficient flexibility to accommodate prevailing notions
about the moral quality of an offense (to say nothing of changing
norms). The "petty offense" concept does. 208

Q. Only a moment ago we were debating whether an indigent
prosecuted for reckless homicide should be afforded counsel. Now
you are urging that even one charged with r~ckless driving should
be, as a matter of absolute right. For somebody who just scolded
me for making the "wedge" objection you are certainly putting the
"wedge" principle to good use. I take it you are now suggesting
that the unqualified right to assigned counsel, as a matter of due
process, be equated with the sixth amendment right to trial by
jury, i.e., only the minor misdemeanors, the "petty offenses,"
should be excluded from coverage.
A. I prefer to say that I am equating the right to assigned counsel under the fourteenth amendment with the same right under
the sixth.

Q. I beg your pardon.
A. The sixth amendment begins: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy ...." The Court has had occasion to
interpret the phrase "criminal prosecutions" in trial by jury
cases,209 but the "criminal prosecutions" category qualifies all the
rights enumerated in the sixth amendment-one of which happens
to be "the assistance of counsel."210
UNITED STATES 57-59 (1951); Doub &: Kestenbaum, Federal Magistrates for the Trial of
Petty Offenses: Need and Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 443 (1959); Frankfurter
&: Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,
39 HARV. L. REv. 917 (1926).
208 "We are aware that those standards of action and of policy which find expression in the common and statute law may vary from generation to generation. • • •
[W]e may assume, for present purposes, that commonly accepted views of the severity
of punishment by imprisonment may become so modified that a penalty once thought
to be mild may come to be regarded as so harsh as to call for the jury trial, which
the Constitution prescribes, in some cases which were triable without a jury when
the Constitution was adopted..•. Doubts must be resolved . . . by objective standards
such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge
of its social and ethical judgments." Stone, J., in District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1937). See also District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930),
discussed in note 205 supra.
200 E.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, supra note 208 (dealing in secondhand
goods without a license, punishable by a maximum sentence of 90 days or $300 fine only
a "petty offense"); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904) (violation of Oleomargarine
Act, punishable by a maxinmm fine of $50, only a "petty offense''); Callan v. Wilson,
127 U.S. 540 (1888) ("conspiracy" a "criminal prosecution'').
210 Cf. Counselman v. Hitchcock., 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892): "It is argued ••• that
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If the right to assigned counsel in all federal prosecutions except those for petty offenses "rests on a pervasive sense of justice,"211 why shouldn't the same approach carry over to state prosecutions for the same reasons?

Q. Pretty neat.
A. Not that neat. The "petty offense" concept does not functhe investigation before the grand jury was not a criminal case [for purposes of the
privilege against self-incrimination] .••• In support of this view reference is made
to article 6 of the amendments . . • • But this provision distinctly means a criminal
prosecution against a person who is accused and who is to be tried by a petit jury.
A criminal prosecution under article 6 of the amendments is much narrower than a
'criminal case,' under article 5•.•."
It has been asserted that "the language of the sixth amendment seems clear" in
guaranteeing the right of a federal petty offender to be represented by counsel retained
by him. Note, 48 CAI.IF. L. REv. 501, 505 (1960). It is clear that a federal petty offender
has such a right-so does the federal civil litigant-but fifth amendment due processnot the sixth amendment right to counsel-seems to confer it. Cf. Levine v. United
States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960): "Procedural safeguards for criminal contempts do not
derive from the Sixth Amendment. Criminal contempt proceedings are not within 'all
criminal prosecutions' to which that Amendment applies • • • • But while the right
to a 'public trial' is explicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment only for 'criminal
prosecutions,' that provision is a reflection of the notion ••• that 'justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.' • • • Accordingly, due process demands appropriate regard
for the requirements of a public proceeding in cases of criminal contempt."
The aforementioned Note does recognize that an absolute right to assigned counsel
in cases of petty federal offenses "could create substantial practical problems," e.g.,
"the burden placed on members of the bar, who are not paid for their services," and
"additional time spent in jail by defendants awaiting trial." Id. at 506. But it concludes, id. at 506-07: "Should the rationale underlying the broad language in Evans v.
Rives [126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942)] be accepted by the Supreme Court, however, the
appointment of counsel even in these minor cases would seem to be required.''
The aforementioned Evans case is apparently the only federal case to consider the
problem. In the course of holding that petitioner, charged with the misdemeanor of
failing to support a minor child, was entitled to appointed counsel if he could not
retain his own, the court commented, id. at 638: "It is further suggested ••• that the
constitutional guaranty of the right to the assistance of counsel in a criminal case
[actually, this is not the wording in the sixth amendment, but the broader language of
the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination, Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra]
does not apply except in the event of 'serious offenses.' No such differentiation is made
in the wording of the guaranty itself, and we are cited to no authority, and know of
none, making this distinction • . . • [S]o far as the right to the assistance of counsel
is concerned, the Constitution draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a short
period and such loss for a long one.''
It is patent that the Evans court did not consider, nor did the District call to its
attention, the sixth amendment trial by jury misdemeanor-petty offense distinction. Of
course there was no point in the District's doing so. The non-support charge, albeit a
misdemeanor, carried a maximum punishment of one year in the workhouse-petitioner's
actual sentence. Clearly, this made it more than a "petty offense"; indeed twenty years
earlier the Supreme Court had classified this very offense an "infamous crime.'' United
States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922). Thus. all the District could do was contend that
the sixth amendment right to counsel did not apply to any misdemeanor prosecution.
The court ruled to the contrary, but it did not hold-since this was not a "petty
offense" case it could not hold-that the sixth amendment right to assigned counsel
extended to petty offenders as well.
211

See note 14 supra.
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tion automatically. If this is its weakness, it is also its strength.
Sure, there may be a presumption that a maximum punishment
of ninety days or even six months imprisonment connotes a "petty"
or "summary" character,212 but in the last analysis"This qualified requirement ... invokes judgment and not
mechanical tests in the use of common-law history in the life
of the law today. We cannot exclude recognition of a scale of
moral values according to which some offenses are heinous
and some are not .... The history of the common law does
not solve the problem of judgment which it raises in demonstrating that the guaranty . . . did not cover offenses which,
because of their quality and their consequences, had a relatively minor place in the register of misconduct." 213

Q. Even if all you seek is accomplished, the indigent petty
offender will still be discriminated against on account of his poverty. Unlike his more fortunate brethren he must still "go it
alone."
A. First you protest that to extend the absolute right to assigned counsel beyond capital offenses is to go too far; now you
complain that to stop short of petty offenses is not to go far enough.
Pardon me, but I am not impressed by your sudden solicitude for
the indigent. What do you expect me to do? Deprive those who
212 Cf. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627-29 (1937): "[W]e may
doubt whether summary trial with punishment of more than six months' imprisonment,
prescribed by some pre-Revolutionary statutes, is admissible without concluding that a
penalty of ninety days is too much . . • • The record of statute and judicial decision is
persuasive that there has been no such change in the generally accepted standards of
punishment as would overcome the presumption that a summary punishment of ninety
days' imprisonment, permissible when the Constitution was adopted, is permissible now."
An early draft of the MODEL PENAL CoDE, § 1.05(4), at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954),
defined a "petty misdemeanor" as an offense not punishable by more than three months'
imprisonment. The revised definition designates an offense a "petty misdemeanor"
if the maximum sentence does not e.xceed thirty days. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.04(4), at 6
(Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The Federal Criminal Code characterizes as "petty" those
offenses punishable by no more than six months' imprisonment, $500, or both. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1958). That the sole criterion is the severity of potential punishment is conceptually
unsound. The Clawans opinion first notes that "apart from the prescribed penalty, the of•
fense of which petitioner was convicted is, by its nature, of this ["petty'1 class" [300 U.S. at
625); then considers the significance of the maximum penalty. Moreover, the Court has
ruled that reckless driving cannot be classified as a "petty offense," notwithstanding a max•
imum penalty of thirty days or $100. See note 205 supra. However, two commentators have
concluded that factors other than the severity of potential punishment "have only
academic relevance here, for all offenses now in the United States Code which fall within
the petty offense definition appear clearly not to involve any 'obvious depravity' and
hence may constitutionally be classed as petty offenses." Doub &: Kestenbaum, supra note
207, at 469.
213 Frankfurter 8: Corcoran, supra note 207, at 981.
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can afford to hire a lawyer of their right to do so in order to place
all petty offenders, rich and poor, at an "equal" disadvantage?214

Q. I thought you were a man of principle. I expected you to
take the position that imprisonment-for however short a spell
-ought never to be available as a punitive sanction unless the
defendant has the guiding hand of counsel.
A. Some day, maybe. " 'Due process' is perhaps, the least frozen concept of our law ... the most absorptive of powerful standards of a progressive society."215 Some day, but not now. "[A]t any
given time," due process "includes those procedures that are fair
and feasible in the light of then existing values and capabilities."216
I do adhere to principle-this one. Thus, we would do well to
take into account the "feeling for judicial economy and dignity,
realization of the disproportionate burden upon courts, jurors and
defendants of handling all crimes upon the same procedural basis,
and ... moral judgment"217 reflected in the historic classification
of petty offenses.

Q. You draw a somewhat ragged line.
A. "There are objections to every line which can be drawn,
and some line must be drawn." 218 I don't deny that there may be
some objections to putting the line where I do, but, as I tried to
214 Cf. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert: Counsel in the Peno-Correctional
Process, 45 MINN. L. REv. 803, 839 (1961): "Of course, there is inevitably a strong moral
and practical pressure, once the right to counsel is recognized, to extend the benefit of
that right to all who claim it, whether or not they can afford it, through provisions for
the appointment of counsel. And given the multitude of parole and revocation proceedings it may prove inordinately expensive and otherwise impractical for the state
to provide counsel. . . . It is hardly a proper solution to the institutional inadequacies
which create the problem to deprive those who can obtain counsel of their right to do
so. Financial inability to hire counsel when the need is legally recognized may well
create a sense of unfairness and perhaps a degree of hopelessness in inmates and parolees
and this may operate adversely to the rehabilitative end. But it is a matter of balancing
gains and losses and one may reasonably find a greater injustice and obstacle to reform
in the blanket refusal to permit representation by counsel, especially in view of the
contributions to the integrity of the parole process itself which the presence of retained
counsel tends to make."
215 Frankfurter, J., concurring in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21 (1956).
216 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1956).
(Emphasis added.)
217 Doub &: Kestenbaum, supra note 207, at 447. "(I]nquiries by the Administrative
Office disclosed that the [United States] commissioners in Upper Marlboro and Bethesda,
Maryland, and in Alexandria, Virginia, disposed of 3,981, 2,789 and 11,762 petty offenses
[chiefly traffic offenses and parking violations] respectively during the past fiscal year." Id.
at 447 n.24.
218 Lord Macaulay, Note M, at 56, in INDIAN LAW COMMISSIONERS PENAL CODE (1837).
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demonstrate earlier, there are many more objections to leaving
the line where it now is-at capital offenses.

Q. What of the petty offender of low intelligence and less education? What if "for want of benefit of counsel an ingredient of
unfairness actively operated"219 in the proceeding that resulted in
a ninety-day confinement?
A. All I have said so far is that the conviction of an uncounselled indigent for a "petty offense" need not be overturned without a specific showing of prejudice.

Q. So, we come back to the Betts rule after all.
A. Yes, when the charge is "dumping ashes in the harbor of
New York," 220 not robbery or burglary.

Q. Nor reckless driving or petty theft. One test for petty misdemeanants; another test for other misdemeanants. The constitutional right to counsel will still depend on differences of degree.
A. Is that bad? "The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized."221

V.

RETROACTIVE OR PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION?

Q. There is yet another dimension to the problem of "drawing the line": the retroactive operation of a decision overruling
Betts. "[S]uch an abrupt innovation ... would furnish opportunities hitherto uncontemplated for opening wide the prison doors
of the land. " 222
A. Fiat justitia ruat coelum.

Q. Incredible! A moment ago you recognized that, abstract
justice to the contrary notwithstanding, existing capabilities preclude a "flat requirement" of counsel for petty offenders. Now you
are telling me that justice is absolute and eternal. You were right
the first time.
I realize you regard "private law" as something a student has
219 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 137 (1947).
220 The poignant illustration of a petty offense

used in Frankfurter 8: Corcoran,
supra note 207, at 981.
221 Holmes, J., concurring in LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, M. 8: St. P. Ry., 232 U.S.
340, 354 (1914).
222 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 139 (1947).
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to endure in order to learn all about criminal law and procedure,
and constitutional law. But I had hoped that you would have at
least read up to page three of Corbin's great treatise: 223 "Fiat justitia ruat coelum is a phrase impressive mainly because of its being
in Latin and not understandable. When the skies begin to fall,
Justice removes the blindfold from her eyes and tilts the scale."
True, justice must reign "but not a justice of fallacious absolutes
in a realistic world of relativity." 224
A. I didn't notice the heavens falling when Griffin was applied
retroactively.225

Q. That's different. The constitutional objection to denying
an indigent the right to appellate review does not affect the judgment of conviction.226
A. All right, I can make my point without even venturing outside the right to counsel field. In Palmer v. Ashe,227 the Court held
that the habeas corpus petition of a non-capital defendant entitled
him to a judicial hearing because the allegations satisfied the "special circumstances" test of Betts and subsequent cases. But petitioner had been sentenced (on a guilty plea) eleven years before
Betts was handed down, and even a year before the Powell case.228
Nobody suggested that Powell and Betts should not be applied
retroactively. Not one of the four Justices who dissented on other
grounds. Nor even the State of Pennsylvania-Palmer's locale.

Q. This, too, is different. A "flat requirement" of assigned
counsel in all capital cases and a "special circumstances" test in
non-capital cases open the prison doors but a few inches. Weren't
you the fellow who told me that the whole law depends on differences of degree as soon as it is civilized?
A. How do you get around Walker v. ]ohnston? 229 Following
1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1 (1950).
6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1375, at 14 (1962).
Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
At least this is so where a transcript of the proceedings is available. See Norvell
v. Illinois, 25 Ill. 2d 169, 182 N.E.2d 719, cert. granted, 371 U.S. 860 (1962). The state
court held that defendant was not entitled to a new trial when he could not secure a
transcript because of the death of the court reporter whose notes could not be transcribed.
To the same effect, see People v. Berman, 19 Ill. 2d 579, 169 N.E.2d 108 (1960), where no
stenographic notes of the trial had ever been made.
•
227 342 U.S. 134 (1951). See also Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948), holding
that petitioner, sentenced four years before Betts was handed down, met the "special
circumstances" test.
228 342 U.S. at 138 (dissenting opinion).
220 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
223
!!24
22lS
226
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his plea of guilty to a non-capital federal offense, petitioner was
sentenced to a long term-two years before Johnson v. Zerbst. 230
Pointing out that in 1938 and 1939, for example, "more than
70,000 pleas of guilty were filed in federal courts," 231 and that "in
March 1937 the Attorney General urged that counsel be appointed
in each case in which the defendant has not retained counsel, unless he expressly states that he wishes to conduct his own defense
(Circular No. 2946),"232 the Government implored: "Such reforms
can be achieved legislatively without the retroactivity of constitutional adjudication." 233
A unanimous Court was singularly unimpressed. The point
was not deemed worthy of discussion. "If he did not voluntarily
waive his right to counsel [citing Johnson v. Zerbst], . . . he was
deprived of a constitutional right.... On this record it is his right
to be heard." 234 And that was that. Did the skies fall? 235

Q. You are forgetting all about the pre-1938 federal practice.
"The Court chose to adopt a more enlightened procedure" in
] ohnson "because modern conditions and attitudes seemed to
make such action desirable. . . . The judges and lawyers in the
majority of federal districts would not oppose it, because their
practice and custom had placed them in most instances under such
a rule." 236
A. And you are completely overlooking the post-Betts state
practice.237 Of the thirteen jurisdictions whose laws or rules still
304 U.S. 458 (1938).
Brief for United States, p. 48, Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
232 Id. at 48-49.
233 Id. at 49.
234 312 U.S. at 286-87.
235 Writing in 1953 (according to the preface), Professor Beaney reported; "While
only twelve cases involving the Sixth Amendment counsel provision had reached circuit
courts up to 1939, ninety cases have gone up since 1939." BEANEY 45 n.81.
236 Id. at 44. However, Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment,
20 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1, 8 (1944), indicates that the pre-Johnson federal practice left much to
be desired: "[S]ome district courts did not appoint counsel for a defendant who appeared
without an attorney, unless the defendant affirmatively and expressly requested that a
lawyer be designated to represent him. It was common practice not to assign counsel for
a defendant desiring to plead guilty."
237 The information hereinafter discussed in the text is based on recent corre•
spondence with prosecuting attorneys and/or the attorney general's office in jurisdictions
whose statutes or rules do not provide for assigned counsel as of right in all felony cases.
Ex.tensive extracts are collected in app. I to Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on "The Most Pervasive Right" of an Accused.
30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1962).
230
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do not require the appointment of counsel in all felony cases without regard to "special circumstances," the practice appears to be
to furnish counsel almost invariably to all indigent felony defendants, at least when they so request, in five (Delaware, Maine, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont) and the usual practice
is to do so in three others (Maryland, Hawaii and Pennsylvania).
This leaves only the five southern states of Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North and South Carolina. In at least three of the largest
counties of Florida, the public defender or a court-appointed lawyer represents all indigent defendants unable to make bond.

Q. What about the uncounselled accused who did not request
a lawyer? A number of the "liberal practice" states, indeed a good
number of the states whose laws or rules extend the "flat requirement" of assigned counsel to non-capital cases, in effect condition
the right on the accused's request for such appointment.238 "But
it is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional
requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a
request" 239 and "presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an allegation and
evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer."240
Moreover, however "liberal" the state practice has become in
recent years, what was it ten or fifteen years ago? The uncounselled
defendants convicted then who still linger in prison pose the real
problem. The State may not be able to reprosecute them successfully. Witnesses die; evidence disappears.
A. To respond to your second point first, again we simply
don't know how many prisoners fall into this category. For one
thing, there is reason to think that, in those jurisdictions whose
laws or rules do not go beyond the minimum requirements of
Betts, the longer the maximum sentence the more likely a "flat
requirement" approach is taken as a matter of practice. For example, in South Carolina, one of the very few states in the nation
where the Betts rule holds sway, relatively unmitigated by local
rules or liberal practice, a veteran county attorney has observed:
"I have never in twenty-five years of practice seen anyone tried
238 See Fellman,

The Right to Counsel Under State Law, 1955

Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
240 Id. at 516.
230

WIS. L. REv. 281, 303-05.
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for a crime carrying a penalty greater than five years without the
Judge appointing counsel."241

Q. It's not so much that you don't know as it is that you don't
care. No matter how catastrophic it may be, you are bent on applying a decision overruling Betts to all cases, past and present. Once
it is overruled, Betts will never have existed, regardless of what
la-wyers and litigants have thought and done to the contrary. If
there is a better example of "mechanical" jurisprudence, I don't
know what it is.242
A. I do. "Freezing the law into a changeless code" simply because people have relied on it.243
Now that I think about it, I mfly have been a bit hasty. If the
practical consequences of a retroactive overruling will be as dire
as you claim (although I still doubt it), then something less than
across-the-board retroactive application may be warranted.244 For
example, the problems raised by the failure of the accused to request counsel might be met by some type of "selective retroactive
application": those petitioners who neither requested counsel nor
evidenced any financial inability to procure one must still satisfy
a "special circumstances" test.245
I must say that I am not enamored of such an approach, for a
procedural due process right which goes to the heart of the guiltdetermining process-as does the assistance of counsel246-is
241 Letter from H. Wayne Unger, Colleton County Attorney, to Yale Kamisar, June 14,
1962, on file in the University of Minnesota Law Library.
242 See WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION 187 n.9 (1961).
243 See 6A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 4079 (2d ed. 1961). See also WASSERSTROM, op. cit.
supra note 242, at 151.
244 The retrospective-prospective application problem has evoked a vast amount of
literature. In addition to the authorities cited elsewhere in this section, see, e.g., Covington, The American Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 24 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 190, 203 (1946); Kocourek
&: Koven, Renovation of the Common Law Through Stare Decisis, 29 !LL. L. REV. 971
(1935); Levy, Realist Jurispmdence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1
(1960); Moore &: Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law of the Case, 21
TEXAS L. REv. 514 (1943); Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1947).
245 Cf. Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 943 (1962) (suggesting selective retroactive application
in coerced confession area).
246 On the other hand, the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases is not
directed at preserving the integrity of the guilt-determining process, but designed to
discourage future police misconduct. This has led many commentators to suggest that
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), be given prospective effect only. Sec Bender, The
Retroactive Effect of an Overruling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA.
L. R.Ev. 650 (1962); Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J.
218, 236 n.105 (1961); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE
L.J. 319, 338-42; Weinstein, Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure
Practice, 34 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 150, 172 (1962); Note, 16 RUTGERS L. R.Ev. 587, 591-94
(1962); Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 942-43 (1962). But see Torcia &: King, The Mirage of
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hardly the best place to resist general retroactive application of an
overruling decision. But I am willing to recognize the possibility
that such resistance could successfully be waged even here, so
that I may ask: just what are we fighting about? Whether or not
Betts should be overruled retroactively, can't we agree that at
least it should be overruled prospectively?

Q. I'm afraid not. The Supreme Court has never given an
overruling constitutional decision prospective application only,241
and there is some doubt that it can so limit the effect of a decision.
A. Really? Doesn't the famous Durham case248 well illustrate
that federal courts, as well as state courts, "have inherent power
to limit decisions to prospective operation"?249

Q. Justice Black recently pointed out: "This Court and in
fact all departments of the Government have always heretofore
realized that prospective law making is the function of Congress
rather than of the courts. We continue to think that this function
should be exercised only by Congress under our constitutional
system."2150
A. I would be considerably more impressed with Justice
Black's position if, when he took it, he had not been protesting
the result in James v. United States, 251 to wit, so far as prosecutions
Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 DICK. L. REv. 269 (1962), especially at 298, 288 n.90, 284 n.73.
241 But cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Does not the "with
all deliberate speed" order imply that the segregation cases need not be given full
retroactive effect, i.e., it permits Negro students to continue to be denied the equal
protection of the laws? Would not the sustaining of a grade-by-grade integration plan,
affecting only incoming students, be an instance of pure prospective overruling?
248 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). "[I]n adopting a new
test [of criminal responsibility], we invoke our inherent power to make the change
prospectively. The rule we now hold must be applied on the retrial of this case and in
future cases." Id. at 874. See also Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (Vinson,
J.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941) (overruling decision narrowing scope of statutory
summary contempt, not given retroactive effect).
249 DAVIS, Am,IINISTRATIVE LAw § 5.09, at 352 (1958). Professor Davis treats the
problem more extensively at 2 id. § 17.07.
The phrase "prospective operation" has a variety of meanings. See 6A MooRE, op. cit.
supra note 243, at 4081-82. It is here used to mean application of the newly-announced
rule to conduct occurring subsequent to the announcement and also to the present litigants. Whether a federal court could fashion a new rule and apply it only to conduct
occurring subsequently raises significant article III problems. See Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907,
930-33 (1962).
250 James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 225 (1961) (concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
2151 366 U.S. 213 (1961).

278

MICHIGAN LAW

R.Evmw

[Vol. 61

for evasion are concerned, the decision overruling a prior holding
that embezzlements are not income is prospective only.252 I would
be more impressed, too, if elsewhere, in a case articulating a new
rule of trustee liability, Black himself had not plumped for "prospective application only."253
It is difficult to see how it can be said that the Constitution
precludes the prospective-effect approach: "The overruling decision is rendered in an actual controversy between adverse parties.
The fact that a former decision is overruled, but without retroactive effect, indicates a careful and thoughtful evaluation of the
correct legal doctrines involved. The prospective application of
the overruling decision is merely a product of the case or controversy presented."254

Q. Well, at least we're making some headway.
A. Much less than you think. Whether or not we give retroactive effect to the decision overruling Betts, most of the uncounselled defendants who went to prison ten or fifteen years ago and
and who are still there will merit a new trial anyway.

Q. I beg your pardon.
A. Haven't you noticed? The Betts rule, like many other
things, "ain't what it used to be." Betts required that "want of
counsel in a particular case . . . result in a conviction lacking . . .
fundamental fairness." 255 Uveges v. Pennsylvania256 demanded that
the particular facts, such as the gravity and the complexity of the
offense, and the age and education of the defendant, "render criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result in injustice as
to be fundamentally unfair." 257 But in the recent case of Hudson
v. North Carolina,258 where counsel for a co-defendant, in the
For a careful discussion of this case, see Note, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 923-27 (1962).
"Despite its novelty, there is much to be said in favor of such a rule for cases
arising in the future. It seems to me, however, that there is no reason why the rule
should be retroactively applied to this respondent when to do so is grossly unfair••••
[I]f the new rule is to be announced by the Court, I think it should be given prospective
application only." Black, J., dissenting in Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 276 (1951).
254 6A MOORE, op. cit. supra note 243, at 4083-84. See also Note, 16 RUTGERS L. REv.
587, 588-91 (1962). Again, by "prospective effect" is meant that the new rule would apply
to the present litigants, i.e., the new rule would be decisive of the instant case and
controversy. See the discussion in note 249 supra.
255 316 U.S. at 473.
256 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
257 Id. at 441.
258 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
252
253
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presence of the jury, had tendered a plea of guilty to a misdemeanor on behalf of his client, the Court dwelt on "the potential
prejudice of such an occurrence"259 to other co-defendants, on the
fact that the co-defendant's plea "raised problems requiring professional knowledge and experience beyond a layman's ken" 260what trial occurrences do not?
"[T]he Court did not consider the gravity of the error either
from the standpoint of 'fundamental fairness' or from the standpoint of North Carolina law."281 Now that Hudson is on the books,
it seems that "whenever error occurs which is reversible under
state law the denial of counsel results by that very fact in 'fundamental unfairness.' " 262
Fifteen years ago, the Court could say: "[I]n every case in
which ... due process was found wanting, the prisoner sustained
the burden of proving, or was prepared to prove ... that for want
of benefit of counsel an ingredient of unfairness actively operated
in the process that resulted in his confinement." 263 And fourteen
years ago, it could say: "[T]he disadvantage from absence of counsel, when aggravated by circumstances showing that it resulted
in the prisoner actually being taken advantage of, or prejudiced,
does make out a case of violation of due process."284 But compare
the very recent case of Chewning v. Cunningham,265 where the
Court struck down a ten-year sentence under Virginia's recidivist
statute:
"Counsel . . . has shown the wide variety of problems that
may be tendered. In Virginia, a trial under this statute may
present questions such as whether the courts rendering the
prior judgments had jurisdiction over the offenses and over
the defendant and whether these offenses were punishable
by a penitentiary sentence.... Double jeopardy and ex post
facto application of a law are also questions which ... may
well be considered by an imaginative lawyer, who looks critically at the layer of prior convictions on which the recidivist
charge rests. We intimate no opinion on whether any of the
problems mentioned would arise on petitioner's trial nor,
Id. at 702. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 704-.
The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 81, 136 (1960).
262 Id. at 137.
263 Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 137 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
264 Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948). (Emphasis added.)
265 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
259

260
261
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if so, whether any would have merit. We only conclude that
a trial on a charge of being a habitual criminal is such a serious one ... [and] the issues presented under Virginia's statute
so complex, and the potential prejudice resulting from the
absence of counsel so great that the rule we have followed concerning the appointment of counsel in other types of criminal
trials is equally applicable here." 266
One can like the result in Hudson and still admit that, as
the dissenters put it, the majority's view that the co-defendant's
plea placed defendant in a prejudiced position "is purely speculative."267 One can welcome the approach taken in Chewning,
and still concur that "the bare possibility that any of these improbable claims could have been asserted does not amount to
the 'exceptional circumstances' which, under ... Betts v. Brady
... must be present before the Fourteenth Amendment imposes
on the State a duty to provide counsel." 268 Can't an "imaginative
lawyer" always think up defenses not considered by an unrepresented defendant? Isn't the "potential prejudice" resulting from
the absence of counsel always great? After Hudson and Chewning,
what is left of Betts v. Brady to overrule?
The Betts rule, as it has evolved up to the year 1962, will be
applied retroactively, even if the. decision formally overruling
Betts will not. The recent decisions minimizing the showing of
"prejudice" required by Betts are being given retroactive effect
right now.269 Yet these decisions have diminished the requisite
showing of prejudice to the vanishing point.
Id. at 446-47. (Emphasis added.)
363 U.S. at 705. "[I']he jury-despite language in the court's charge which indicated the presence of 'violence, intimidation and putting [the victim] in fear'-refused
to find petitioner guilty of .•• robbery, but only ••• the lesser offense, larceny from the
person. The record here would clearly support a verdict of guilty on the robbery charge.
• • • [I]t would be much more realistic to say that [the co-defendant's] plea of guilty
influenced the jury not to find petitioner guilty of the greater offense." Ibid.
268 368 U.S. at 459 (Harlan, J., concurring).
269 That significant modifications of a rule (as well as its dramatic overruling) are
applied retroactively is well illustrated by Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), ordering
petitioner's release twenty-five years after he was sentenced to 199 years for murder. In
denying habeas corpus relief, the district court observed that "Reck was convicted • • •
in 1936 [the year the first due process confession case was handed down by the Supreme
Court] and at that time the Due Process clause was not violated by the circumstances
surrounding the making of his confession.'' 172 F. Supp. 734, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1959). The
early due process confession cases rested on "coercion proved in fact.'' Id. at 743. Fourteenth amendment violations were not based on whether conditions "surrounding the
making of the confession were 'inherently coercive' "-petitioner's situation-until years
later. Id. at 740. In reversing, the Supreme Court did not discuss the "retroactivity"
point. Agreeing that "this case lacks the physical brutality present in Brown v. Mississippi
[297 U.S. 278 (1936)]," 367 U.S. at 442, the Court went on to find, id. at 443, that "the
266
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Don't you see-your anxiety over "changing the law" is misplaced. Today, it would be much more of an "abrupt innovation"270 to reinstate the Betts rule with all its original rigor than
simply to finish it off!
No doubt the reluctance to overrule Betts retroactively has
contributed significantly to its survival-but only to a nominal
one. Here, as elsewhere"The alternative is to live uneasily with an unfortunate precedent by wearing it thin with distinctions that at last compel
a cavalier pronouncement, heedless of the court's failure to
make a frank overruling, that it must be deemed to have revealed itself as overruled by its manifest erosion. It must be
cold comfort to bewildered counsel to ruminate that the precedent on which he relied was never expressly overruled because it so patently needed to be."271

Q. Your argument proves too much. Why urge that Betts
be overruled if it has already happened?
A. Because too many troops haven't gotten the word272-and
never will. Hence the need for a plain, clean overruling. "When
the relevant rules are shoddy or clumsy it takes a master craftsman
to bring out a fine and satisfying product, but if the rules are good
enough they make it hard for even the dull or duffer to go too far
wrong."27s
A Final Reflection

Q. And the further we extend the "flat requirement" of
counsel, the better the rule.

A. Up to a point, at least past "felonies." But we've been
through all that.

Q. That you suggest a stopping point is of some comfort, but
you are still asking for a great deal.
record here • • • presents a totality of coercive circumstances far more aggravated than
those which dictated our decision in Turner [Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1948)]."

270
271

Cf. text at note 222 supra.
Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL lNS1lTU'l10NS TODAY AND
TOMORROW 48, 54 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
272 A number of state courts are still applying the Betts rule with all its old rigor.
See, e.g., Artrip v. State, So. 2d 574 (Ala. Ct. App. 1962); Pogolich v. State, 14-1 So. 2d 206
(Ala. Ct. App. 1962); Jones v. Cochran, 125 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1960); Commonwealth ex rel.
Simon v. Maroney, 405 Pa. 562, 176 A.2d 94 (1961) (collateral attack of 1942 conviction).
273 LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON! DECIDING .APPEALS 291 (1960).
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A. I think not. "There comes a point," Justice Frankfurter
once observed in a famous confession case, "where this Court should
not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men."214 I ask even
less. I ask only that the Court not be ignorant as judges of what
they know as lawyers.
274

Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949).

